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After the financial and banking crisis of the late 2000s, the FASB and the IASB aimed to develop 
methods of accounting for credit losses that would give more timely recognition of those losses. 
The IASB (in 2009) and the FASB (in 2010) each initially issued its own exposure draft proposing 
separate approaches to achieving this. They then attempted to agree a converged expected-loss-
based method for accounting for credit losses, but failed to achieve convergence. They then each 
issued an accounting standard that included its own expected-loss method, with effective dates of 
2018 for the IASB and 2020/21 for the FASB. This paper provides an overview of the development 
of proposals and standards in relation to accounting for credit losses issued by the standard setters 
from 2009 to 2016. It then offers reflections on difficulties that the standard setters faced in this 
area and on problems that might arise after the new standards become effective. It raises the 
question of whether a route based on 'expected loss', which in relation to credit losses is a concept 
that originally became prominent for the purpose of setting banks' capital requirements, was helpful 
to the process of improving the accounting for credit losses.  
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The financial and banking crisis of the late 2000s prompted the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to 
emphasise jointly 'the importance of working cooperatively and in an internationally 
coordinated manner to consider accounting issues emerging from the crisis' and to say that 
'the FASB and the IASB recognize that the urgency of the credit crisis requires 
unprecedented action'.
1
 An issue that attracted particular attention was a perceived lack of 
timeliness in the then-current methods of accounting for credit losses, which is a highly 
material item for banks.
2
 The FASB and the IASB moved quickly to address this issue. In 
light of elements of the history of accounting for credit losses and relevant prior literature, we 
reflect on the process that standard setters went through in the aftermath of the crisis in order 
to achieve more timely accounting recognition of credit losses. Within this, we consider the 
difficulties that the standard setters faced, including in relation to their failure to achieve a 
converged common solution on accounting for credit losses.    
At the time of the financial and banking crisis, both U.S. GAAP and IFRS required 
that credit losses should be accounted for using incurred-loss (hereinafter, IL) methods: credit 
losses should only be recognised where there was evidence based on past events that a loss 
had been incurred. The IL methods in place at that time were more heavily weighted towards 
limiting earnings management and the associated overstatement of loss allowances than 
towards permitting the exercise of discretion that might facilitate timely recognition of credit 
losses and ensure loss-allowance adequacy. At the time of the crisis, concern that the 
restrictive IL methods had contributed to delay in recognition of credit losses prior to the 
crisis prompted calls for more forward-looking methods that would result in the more timely 
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recognition of losses, including from a prudential-regulatory perspective from the Financial 
Stability Board's report to G20 leaders (Financial Stability Board 2009) and the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (hereinafter, BCBS) (BCBS, 2009). Consistent with 
advice from these sources and from the Financial Crisis Advisory Group (2009), the FASB 
and the IASB each pursued the development of more forward-looking methods of accounting 
for credit losses, including methods described as expected-loss (hereinafter, EL) methods. 
With regard to accounting for credit losses, the crisis appears to have prompted a shift in 
relative emphasis away from limiting earnings management and the associated overstatement 
of loss allowances and towards permitting the exercise of discretion that might facilitate 
timely recognition of credit losses and help to ensure that loss allowances are adequate.  
The standard setters' process of developing methods that would lead to the more 
timely recognition of credit losses included the initial issue of separate IASB and FASB 
exposure drafts (IASB 2009, FASB 2010a), the issue of a joint supplementary document and 
follow-up proposals aimed at achieving a converged common solution (FASB/IASB 2011a, 
b), and the eventual failure of the attempt to achieve convergence. The standard setters then 
issued separate final exposure drafts (FASB 2012, IASB 2013a) and separate accounting 
standards (IASB 2014a, FASB 2016) with an effective date of 2018 for the IASB and 2020 or 
2021 for the FASB.  
Within their development of more timely methods of accounting for credit losses, the 
standard setters aimed to address the issue of the breadth of the information set that could be 
used to support the recognition of credit-loss impairment. They also aimed to address the 
perhaps less obvious issue that, when loans are made, the lender expects to suffer some as-
yet-unidentified credit losses that are compensated within the interest revenue that is typically 
accrued in full from year 1 onwards. Under the IL regimes in place, recognition of the 
associated initially-expected losses was delayed until loss events occurred, which typically 
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resulted in some of the credit-premium-inclusive interest revenue being recognised in 
advance of the associated losses. In their initial exposure drafts (IASB 2009, FASB 2010a), 
the two standard setters each proposed a credit-loss-accounting method that would allow 
expected losses to be recognised in advance of the occurrence of the type of loss events 
required by pre-existing IL methods. The methods proposed in those two exposure drafts 
were based on different objectives. The FASB's objective was to ensure that loss allowances 
at each reporting date were sufficient to cover all estimated credit losses for the remaining 
life of in-scope financial assets. This led to a proposed method involving the establishment of 
loss allowances at the first reporting date after origination or purchase, sometimes referred to 
as 'day 1', which would immediately reflect initial expectations of all future credit losses 
expected to occur over the full contractual life of assets. The IASB's objective was to reflect 
initially-expected credit losses within the calculation of the effective interest rate on financial 
assets. This led to a proposed method that explicitly linked initially-expected credit losses 
with the pricing of financial assets at origination, and would result in the recognition of 
initially-expected losses being spread over the life of assets. Like the FASB's proposed 
method, this method would require credit losses to be recognised in advance of the type of 
loss events required under pre-existing IL methods. However, it was less conservative than 
the FASB's proposed method in that recognition of initially-expected losses would be spread 
over the life of assets rather than occurring immediately at day 1. The initial IASB method 
was widely regarded as conceptually strong in the sense that it reflected the economic 
substance of the relationship between the contractual interest rate and initially-expected 
losses.
3
 However, it was also widely regarded as posing a significant implementation 
challenge.  
Subsequent joint deliberations by the FASB and the IASB based on FASB/IASB 
(2011a, b) were aimed at achieving a compromise converged solution that would partially 
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address the objectives of each standard setter. Within these joint deliberations, the FASB and 
the IASB achieved straightforward and converged agreement that the information set that 
could be used to support credit-loss impairment would henceforth be broadened to include 
reasonable and supportable forecasts. This should address to a significant degree the concerns 
raised in the aftermath of the financial and banking crisis about delay in the accounting 
recognition of information about credit losses. However, the standard setters encountered a 
serious problem in their attempts to reach a converged solution for the treatment of initially-
expected losses, and this contributed significantly to their inability to achieve a converged 
overall solution with respect to accounting for credit losses. The joint deliberations 
eliminated from consideration methods that explicitly spread the recognition of initially-
expected losses across time. They produced a proposal that financial assets should be 
categorised with regard to whether or not their credit quality had significantly deteriorated 
since initial recognition: at each reporting date, allowances would recognise lifetime expected 
losses for assets that had significantly deteriorated since initial recognition ('bad book'); at 
each reporting date, including day 1, they would recognise 12-month expected losses for 
assets that had not significantly deteriorated since initial recognition ('good book'). The IASB 
accepted this proposal, seeing the 12-month allowance for good-book assets as a means of 
achieving in a practicable way an approximation to the recognition of initially-expected 
losses over time, which was a central feature of IASB (2009). However, after extensive 
involvement in the deliberations, the FASB indicated that it could not accept this proposal 
and that it could only accept full recognition at each reporting date, including at day 1, of all 
expected losses over the full contractual life of assets. The IASB's preferred approach was 
seen by the FASB as insufficiently conservative; the FASB's preferred approach was seen by 
the IASB as excessively conservative. There is evidence that the FASB's more conservative 
preference was due in part to pre-existing practice that reflected prudential-regulatory-related 
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influence. After their failure to agree on this issue, the two standard setters proceeded to 
develop standards containing separate EL methods based on their respective preferences 
(IASB 2014a, FASB 2016). The process of developing the FASB and IASB standards on 
credit-loss impairment has been controversial both because of the failure to achieve a 
converged common solution and because of some of the proposals themselves. Both standard 
setters' requirements for the immediate establishment of loss allowances at day 1, 12-month 
expected losses in the case of the IASB and full-contractual-life losses in the case of the 
FASB, attracted significant criticism on conceptual grounds. 
In this paper, we describe the events outlined above in the context of the history of 
accounting for credit losses and relevant prior literature and drawing on our confidential 
conversations with senior observers of the process.  We then highlight two issues that may 
give rise to problems when the new credit-loss-impairment standards are implemented: the 
FASB's requirement for lifetime loss allowances and the day-1 loss requirements of both 
standard setters. We then consider whether, in light of issues arising during the development 
of the new EL credit-loss-impairment methods, improved methods of accounting for credit 
losses might have been more straightforwardly achieved through an alternative route to the 
type of EL route that was followed. In particular, we raise the question of whether, after the 
elimination from consideration of spreading-based EL approaches that did not involve day-1 
losses, satisfactory more-forward-looking methods of accounting for credit losses that did not 
involve day-1 losses and that might have presented a lower barrier to FASB/IASB 
convergence might have been developed by following a less radical broader-information-set-
based modified-IL-type route rather than by continuing to follow an EL route. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background on the IL method 
of accounting for credit losses under U.S. GAAP and IFRS, provides background on bank 
regulation relating to credit losses and provides an outline of elements of prior academic 
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literature that are relevant to the matters addressed in this paper. Section 3 outlines the 
development since 2009 by the FASB and the IASB of more timely methods of accounting 
for credit-loss impairment, including with reference to important elements of feedback on the 
standard setters' various proposal documents. Section 4 discusses issues that have arisen 
during the standard setters' development of their EL methods of accounting for credit losses 
that may present problems when the standards become effective. Section 5 considers whether 
a route based on EL was helpful to the process of improving the accounting for credit losses. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Background and literature review 
This section provides a summary of background and literature relevant to the events 
considered in this paper. Subsection 2.1 provides a summary of the history of the pre-existing 
IL methods of accounting for credit losses and of the pressure in the wake of the financial and 
banking crisis of the late 2000s to replace them by more forward-looking methods. 
Subsection 2.2 provides some background on bank regulation that relates to credit losses. 
Subsection 2.3 provides a summary of relevant academic literature.  
 
2.1.  The incurred-loss method of accounting for credit-loss impairment 
At the time of the financial and banking crisis of the late 2000s, the IL method for credit-loss 
impairment, which required that the recognition of loan losses should be supported by 
evidence that a loss had been incurred, was established in U.S. GAAP and in IFRS. This 
subsection provides some background on the IL methods in U.S. GAAP and IFRS that is 





2.1.1. U.S. GAAP: Incurred-loss 
The history of IL in U.S. GAAP includes action motivated by the perceived need to constrain 
discretion that might allow systematic delay in loan-loss recognition and understatement of 
loss allowances and, subsequently, action motivated by the perceived need to constrain 
discretion that might allow systematic overstatement of loss allowances. The latter of these 
appears to have contributed to criticism at the time of the financial and banking crisis of the 
late 2000s of the lack of timeliness of pre-existing methods of accounting for credit losses. 
From 1975, SFAS 5 (FASB 1975) provided guidance on recognition of losses on 
receivables including loans. It included the following requirement: 
An estimated loss from a loss contingency (as defined in paragraph 1) shall be 
accrued by a charge to income if both of the following conditions are met: 
a.  Information available prior to issuance of the financial statements indicates 
that it is probable that an asset had been impaired or a liability had been 
incurred at the date of the financial statements. It is implicit in this 
condition that it must be probable that one or more future events will occur 
confirming the fact of the loss. 
b. The amount of loss can be reasonably estimated. (FASB 1975, paragraph 8) 
 
Following the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s, SFAS 5 was criticised for being 
ambiguous and so flexible that financially weak banks were able to manage earnings upwards 
by delaying recognition of losses (GAO 1991, GAO 1992). In May 1993, the FASB issued 
SFAS 114 (FASB 1993a). This was aimed at providing clearer and more consistent guidance 
on accounting for impairment of loans, other than small homogeneous loans collectively 
evaluated for impairment, including with respect to issues raised in GAO (1992). The 
criterion for recognition of impairment in SFAS 114 was consistent with that in SFAS 5, but 
the more specific guidance might have been expected to reduce the danger referred to by 
GAO (1992) that discretion might be used inappropriately in order to delay the recognition of 
loan losses. SFAS 114 (FASB 1993a) included the following reminder aimed at avoiding 
unduly restrictive interpretation of the IL requirement of FASB (1975): 
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The term probable is further described in paragraph 84 of Statement 5, which 
states: 
The conditions for accrual in paragraph 8 [of Statement 5] are not 
inconsistent with the accounting concept of conservatism. Those conditions 
are not intended to be so rigid that they require virtual certainty before a 
loss is accrued. They require only that it be probable that an asset has been 
impaired or a liability has been incurred and that the amount of loss be 
reasonably estimable. (FASB 1993a, paragraph 10) 
 
Also in May 1993, the FASB issued SFAS 115 (FASB 1993b), which was motivated in part 
by a perceived need for more consistent guidance on impairment of debt securities. The IL 
credit-loss impairment requirements of SFAS 5, SFAS 114 and SFAS 115 were included in 
the pre-FASB (2016) FASB codification topics 450, 310 and 320, respectively. FASB 
codification topic 310 includes the following with respect to loan impairment: 
The following provides an overview of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) 
for loan impairment: 
a.    It is usually difficult, even with hindsight, to identify any single event that 
made a particular loan uncollectible. However, the concept in GAAP is that 
impairment of receivables shall be recognized when, based on all available 
information, it is probable that a loss has been incurred based on past events 
and conditions existing at the date of the financial statements. 
b.   Losses shall not be recognized before it is probable that they have been 
incurred, even though it may be probable based on past experience that 
losses will be incurred in the future. It is inappropriate to consider possible 
or expected future trends that may lead to additional losses. (FASB 
Codification, paragraph 310-10-35-4) 
 
In the years following the issue of SFAS 114 and in contrast to the concern about 
understatement of losses raised prior to the issue of SFAS 114, concern was expressed by 
SEC representatives that U.S. banks might be using discretion inappropriately in order to 
facilitate earnings management through overstatement of loan-loss allowances.
4
 In 1998 the 
SEC questioned the loan-loss accounting of SunTrust Banks Inc. and required it to reduce its 
loan-loss allowance by $100 million. During the SunTrust investigation, the SEC also sent 
letters to a number of U.S. banks questioning their loan-loss allowances (Meyer 1999). These 
actions were viewed as a warning signal to all U.S. banks that the SEC would not tolerate 
over-provisioning for loan losses during good times. However, U.S. bank regulators did not 
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believe that the loan-loss allowances of U.S. banks were systematically excessive. They were 
concerned that the SEC's actions might create a perception that loan-loss allowances would 
have to be reduced, and claimed that any general downward pressure on allowances could 
have a serious effect on the safety of the U.S. banking system (Meyer 1999, Rushton 1999). 
There was concern on the part of U.S. banks that they might be caught in a conflict between 
the SEC and U.S. bank regulators, with the former requiring lower allowances and the latter 
requiring higher allowances (Wall and Koch 2000, pp. 1-2). There ensued a debate between 
the SEC, the FASB and U.S. bank regulators on accounting for credit losses. Then, in July 
2001, the SEC and bank regulators stated their joint position on loan-loss allowances in SAB 
102
5
 and FFIEC (2001), respectively, which required banks to estimate loan-loss allowances 
in accordance with GAAP with enhanced documentation to support their allowance 
estimates. The joint guidance of 2001 might be seen as a tightening of IL loan-loss 
recognition requirements or, at least, as a reaffirmation of the IL principle in U.S. GAAP 
(Camfferman 2015, p. 8). 
Such tightening might be expected to limit loan-loss-related earnings management, 
but at the cost of reduced timeliness in loan-loss recognition. Evidence in Balla and Rose 
(2015) and Beck and Narayanamoorthy (2013) suggests that this may have occurred. Balla 
and Rose (2015) find that, after the guidance of 2001, the relationship between earnings and 
loan-loss expense weakened, indicating reduced earnings management; however, they also 
claim that the guidance constrained U.S. banks' early recognition of losses in the years prior 
to the crisis of the late 2000s. Beck and Narayanamoorthy (2013) report that, after the SAB 
102 and FFIEC (2001) guidance became effective, the estimation of banks' loan-loss 
allowances appeared to become more reliant on past charge-offs and less reliant on current 
non-accrual loans. This was accompanied by a decline in the informativeness, as proxied by 
the ability to explain future losses, of the loss allowances of weak banks after SAB 102 and 
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FFIEC (2001) became effective and especially immediately before the financial and banking 
crisis. The authors suggest two possible reasons for this. First, in the relatively unstable 
environment faced by weak banks, more forward-looking indicators such as non-accrual 
loans are likely to be more beneficial than backward-looking indicators such as past charge-
offs in enhancing the informativeness of loss allowances. Second, although SAB 102 and 
FFIEC (2001) may have been effective in constraining overstatement of loss allowances, they 
could not be expected to be effective in constraining weak banks' management of earnings 
through delay in the recognition of loan losses.
6
  
The perception that effects of the sort indicated by Balla and Rose (2015) and Beck 
and Narayanamoorthy (2013) were at work prior to the crisis led to a swing, in the aftermath 
of the financial and banking crisis, away from concern about earnings management and 
towards concern about timeliness of loss recognition and loss-allowance adequacy. This was 
reflected in, among other things, the comments made in 2009 by the Comptroller of the 
Currency, John Dugan, to the effect that, in the prolonged period of benign economic 
conditions before the late-2000s crisis, a number of banks had felt constrained in their ability 
to document adequately the judgmental factors that might have allowed them to make 




2.1.2. IFRS:  Incurred-loss 
In common with the history of IL in U.S. GAAP, the history of IL in IFRS includes action 
that appears to have been motivated by the perceived need to constrain discretion that might 
allow earnings management. It also includes some indication of the lack of a clear-cut 
distinction between IL and EL that we refer to later in this paper. 
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Prior to the 2003 revision of IAS 39, the word 'incurred' was not used in IAS 39 in 
connection with impairment relating to credit losses. The requirements of the pre-2003 
version of IAS 39 included the following:  
A financial asset is impaired if its carrying amount is greater than its estimated 
recoverable amount. An enterprise should assess at each balance sheet date 
whether there is any objective evidence that a financial asset or group of assets 
may be impaired. If any such evidence exists, the enterprise should estimate 
the recoverable amount of that asset or group of assets and recognise any 
impairment loss […] Objective evidence that a financial asset or group of 
assets is impaired or uncollectable includes information that comes to the 
attention of the holder of the asset about: 
a.  significant financial difficulty of the issuer; 
b.   an actual breach of contract, such as a default or delinquency in interest 
or principal payments; 
c.  granting by the lender to the borrower, for economic or legal reasons 
relating to the borrower's financial difficulty, of a concession that the 
lender would not otherwise consider; 
d.  a high probability of bankruptcy or other financial reorganisation of the 
issuer; 
e. recognition of an impairment loss on that asset in a prior financial 
reporting period; 
f.   the disappearance of an active market for that financial asset due to 
financial difficulties; or 
g.  a historical pattern of collections of accounts receivable that indicates that 
the entire face amount of a portfolio of accounts receivable will not be 
collected. 
The disappearance of an active market because an enterprise's securities are no 
longer publicly traded is not evidence of impairment. A downgrade of an 
enterprise's credit rating is not, of itself, evidence of impairment, though it 
may be evidence of impairment when considered with other available 
information. (IASB 2000, paragraphs 109-110) 
 
Although the term 'incurred' was not used in the credit-loss impairment requirements of the 
pre-2003 version of IAS 39, the evidence requirements quoted above were similar to those of 
the 2003 revision of IAS 39, which are commonly regarded as IL.  
In a detailed review of events related to the 2003 revision of the credit-loss 
impairment requirements of IAS 39, Camfferman (2015, p. 4) notes that the practice of 
making a distinction between IL and EL in the context of accounting for credit losses only 
started to become common at the time of the deliberations leading up to that 2003 revision.
8
 
However, the distinguishing features of EL relative to IL in relation to accounting for credit 
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losses were not clear at that time, as was illustrated by the following from the Basis for 
Conclusions of the 2003 revision of IAS 39:  
Some respondents to the Exposure Draft were confused about whether the 
Exposure Draft reflected an 'incurred loss' model or an 'expected loss' model. 
(IASB 2003, paragraph BC108) 
 
Camfferman (2015) observes that the IASB's deliberations in relation to the 2003 revision of 
IAS 39 tended at times towards more forward-looking EL-type features and tended at other 
times towards strengthening and emphasising the pre-existing loss-event-focused IL-type 
features of the IAS 39 requirements. The IASB eventually came down on the side of an 
affirmation of IL. Camfferman (2015) comments as follows that the desirability of 
convergence with U.S. GAAP and the need to constrain earnings management were 
influential in leading to that outcome: 
The IASB acted under time pressure to improve the standards inherited from 
the IASC for the first mass adoption of IFRS in 2005, with the result that the 
wording of the standard as finally approved by the Board, with respect to loan 
impairment, differed considerably from the proposals on which constituents 
had been asked to comment. In the end, the importance attached to 
convergence with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. 
GAAP) and the prevailing of an anti-abuse perspective on the issue seem to 
have tilted the Board towards a strict incurred-loss model. (Camfferman 2015, 
p. 3) 
 
The revised IAS 39 impairment requirements were as follows: 
A financial asset or a group of financial assets is impaired and impairment 
losses are incurred if, and only if, there is objective evidence of impairment as 
a result of one or more events that occurred after the initial recognition of the 
asset (a 'loss event') and that loss event (or events) has an impact on the 
estimated future cash flows of the financial asset or group of financial assets 
that can be reliably estimated. […] Losses expected as a result of future 
events, no matter how likely, are not recognised.  Objective evidence that a 
financial asset or group of assets is impaired includes observable data that 
comes to the attention of the holder of the asset about the following loss 
events:  
a.  significant financial difficulty of the issuer or obligor;  
b.  a breach of contract, such as a default or delinquency in interest or 
principal payments;  
c.  the lender, for economic or legal reasons relating to the borrower's 
financial difficulty, granting to the borrower a concession that the 
lender would not otherwise consider;  
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d.  it becoming probable that the borrower will enter bankruptcy or other 
financial reorganisation;  
e.  the disappearance of an active market for that financial asset because 
of financial difficulties; or  
f.  observable data indicating that there is a measurable decrease in the 
estimated future cash flows from a group of financial assets since the 
initial recognition of those assets, although the decrease cannot yet be 
identified with the individual financial assets in the group, including:  
i.  adverse changes in the payment status of borrowers in the group 
(e.g., an increased number of delayed payments or an increased 
number of credit card borrowers who have reached their credit limit 
and are paying the minimum monthly amount); or  
ii.  national or local economic conditions that correlate with defaults on 
the assets in the group (e.g., an increase in the unemployment rate 
in the geographical area of the borrowers, a decrease in property 
prices for mortgages in the relevant area, a decrease in oil prices for 
loan assets to oil producers, or adverse changes in industry 
conditions that affect the borrowers in the group). (IASB 2003, 
paragraph 59) 
  
Significant changes introduced in the 2003 revision of IAS 39, which could be seen as a 
reaffirmation of the restrictions of IL, included a statement that impairment should be based 
on 'one or more events that occurred after the initial recognition of the asset (a 'loss event')', 
the explicit prohibition of recognition of 'losses in respect of future events, no matter how 
likely' and the inclusion of more detail on evidence requirements for collective provisioning 
reflected in the replacement of sub-paragraph (g) in the pre-2003 version by sub-paragraph 
(f) in the revised version. 
 As with the U.S. history referred to in the previous subsection, events described here 
contributed to setting the scene for a swing, in the aftermath of the financial and banking 
crisis, away from concern about earnings management and towards concern about timeliness 
of loss recognition and loss-allowance adequacy. 
 
2.1.3. Indications of differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS applications of incurred loss 
  
There is evidence that IL methods as applied in the U.S. gave rise to higher loss allowances 
on average, other things equal, than outside the U.S. Our confidential conversations with 
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senior observers of the development of the FASB and IASB EL methods indicated a widely-
held view that the recognition of loan-losses under the IL approach as applied in the U.S., in 
particular for smaller banks, tended to be at the more conservative end (i.e., higher loss 
allowances) of what is acceptable under the IL method and, other things equal, more 
conservative than in countries using IFRS. A letter written by the American Bankers 
Association (ABA) in response to the FASB (2012) exposure draft contained a comment 
consistent with the view that the hurdle for recognition of loan impairments may have been 
lower under the FASB's IL method than under the IASB's IL method:
9
  
Loss events, appear to be defined as an earlier point in time under U.S. 
accounting practices than under International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS). Under IFRS, the term "loss event" is defined within IAS 39. [...] In 
U.S. GAAP, there is generally no discussion of loss events as they relate to 
loans. However, within bank practices, as guided by banking agencies, the 
following are normally considered "loss events": 
 Borrower loses major source of income. For a consumer, it is normally 
his/her employment. For a commercial borrower, it is a major 
customer. 
 Overall, financial results put repayment at risk, as evidenced in a 
commercial loan review. 
 Property value deterioration, as evidenced when loan to value ratios 
exceed 100%. 
Thus, U.S. practice would likely refer to IAS 39 "loss events" not as loss 
events, but as loss identification events, which are generally subsequent to loss 
events. It is indeed a challenge to estimate when a loss event has occurred in 
the U.S., but there is general agreement that the loss event happens prior to 
default. Thus, the foundation for defining when a loss is a loss under IFRS 
naturally leads to later loss recognition than in the U.S. 
 
Related to this, an ABA document of June 2016 noted evidence that, in determining their loss 
allowances, U.S. banks make substantially greater use than European banks of assumptions 
that losses are 'incurred but not reported' (IBNR).
10
 
 As we describe later, differences of the type referred to above between pre-existing 
practice in the U.S. and elsewhere presented a challenging context for the attempt by the 
FASB and the IASB to develop a common solution for accounting for credit losses. The 
barrier created by the difference in pre-existing practice will have been particularly 
15 
 
challenging in combination with the interaction between U.S. bank regulation and U.S. 
GAAP.
11
   
 
2.1.4. Pressure to adopt expected-loss methods in accounting for credit losses 
We note above the observation in Camfferman (2015) that the IL/EL distinction in relation to 
accounting for credit losses only started to be made at the time of the 2003 revision of IAS 39 
and was not very clear at the time. The discussion in Camfferman (2015) suggests that, even 
for the purpose of describing years later the events leading up to the 2003 revision, the IL/EL 
distinction is best conveyed by reference to 'positions on a continuum of approaches that 
allow greater or lesser scope for early loss recognition' (Camfferman 2015, p. 4): IL tends to 
be used in connection with backward-looking observable concepts such as 'loss events'; EL 
tends to be used in connection with forward-looking concepts such as 'recoverable amounts'; 
EL tends to be used to refer to methods involving the inclusion of expected credit losses in 
the calculation of the effective interest rate; EL tends to be used to refer to methods that 
recognise at portfolio level losses that may not yet be individually identified. The fact that it 
was thought easiest to convey the IL/EL distinction in relation to accounting for credit losses 
by giving indicative characteristics rather than by giving a definition of the distinction is 
indicative of lack of clarity in the distinction. 
Despite a possible lack of clarity with regard to the IL/EL distinction in the context of 
accounting for credit losses, the calls in the aftermath of the banking and financial crisis for 
more timely accounting for credit losses included encouragement to consider EL models. 
Such encouragement came from the Financial Crisis Advisory Group in a report to standard 
setters in July 2009:   
In the financial instruments project, the Boards should explore alternatives to 
the incurred loss model for loan loss provisioning that use more forward- 
looking information. These alternatives include an expected loss model and a 




From a prudential-regulatory perspective, it came from the Financial Stability Board in a 
report to G20 leaders in September 2009: 
We strongly encourage the IASB and FASB to agree on improved converged 
standards that will: 
 Incorporate a broader range of available credit information than existing 
provisioning requirements, so as to recognise credit losses in loan 
portfolios at an earlier stage as part of an effort to mitigate procyclicality. 
We are particularly supportive of continued work on impairment standards 
based on an expected loss model. (Financial Stability Board 2009, pp. 7-8) 
 
Also from a prudential-regulatory perspective, it came from BCBS in August 2009: 
Loan loss provisioning should be robust and based on sound methodologies 
that reflect expected credit losses in the banks' existing loan portfolio over the 
life of the portfolio… The accounting model for provisioning should allow 
early identification and recognition of losses by incorporating a broader range 
of available credit information than presently included in the incurred loss 
model and should result in an earlier identification of credit losses. (BCBS 
2009, paragraph 12). 
 
It is easy to understand why, in the aftermath of a financial and banking crisis in 
which lack of timeliness in accounting for credit losses had attracted attention, the 
replacement of a backward-looking restrictive IL method by a more forward-looking EL 
method would appear attractive. A rhetorical question asked by a speaker at a European 
Parliament hearing on IFRS 9 captures the immediately apparent attraction of the concept of 
EL in the context of accounting for credit losses: 'who would not want to provide for a loss, 
which is expected?' (Mike Ashley, European Parliament, 1 December 2015).
12
 Such 
rhetorical questions sometimes imply that the answer is not as straightforward as might first 
appear. 
 
2.2. Some background on bank regulation that relates to credit losses 
Events described in this paper relate in some ways to the interests of prudential regulators and 
therefore to any influence that prudential regulators might be perceived to have had on these 
events. In light of this, we provide in this subsection some background information on aspects 
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of bank regulation that relate to credit losses. Much of bank regulation deals with the 
determination of the capital that banks are required to hold and with the measurement of the 
capital that they actually hold. These are a central focus of the various Basel accords (BCBS 
1988, BCBS 2006, BCBS 2011). For the purposes of this paper, these accords provide a 
useful indicator of the interest that bank regulators might have in the issue of accounting for 
credit losses.  
Under the Basel framework, the regulatory capital that a bank is required to hold is set 
by reference to the risk attached to its activities and is aimed at covering unexpected losses 
that, in light of that risk, might arise. A key principle underlying the measurement of actual 
regulatory capital is that it should be measured after deducting appropriate allowances for 
expected losses, thereby ensuring that capital is fully available to absorb unexpected losses. 
This principle has become blurred where regulatory-capital rules have permitted loss 
allowances recognised in banks' financial statements to be treated as part of regulatory 
capital.
13
 In the remainder of this subsection, we outline elements of the treatment of loan-
loss allowances under the various Basel accords. 
The 1988 Basel 1 accord defined capital for bank-supervisory purposes as comprising 
two tiers: Tier 1, described as core capital; Tier 2 described as supplementary capital. Under 
Basel 1, general loss allowances, which along with other loss allowances reduced book equity 
and Tier 1 capital by their net-of-tax amount, were included in Tier 2 capital up to a 
maximum of 1.25% of risk-weighted assets (BCBS 1988, paragraphs 18 and 21).  
The Basel 2 framework (BCBS 2004b, BCBS 2006) introduced three 'pillars' which, 
collectively, were aimed at promoting stronger risk-management practices in the banking 
industry: pillar 1 'Minimum Capital Requirements', which deals with the calculation of 
minimum capital requirements and with the measurement of regulatory capital, including 
with regard to the treatment of expected credit losses in the measurement of regulatory 
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capital; pillar 2 'Supervisory Review Process', which relates to internal-control mechanisms 
with regard to risk and capital requirements; pillar 3 'Market Discipline', which is aimed at 
ensuring that disclosure is adequate to inform market participants about risk and capital 
requirements. Under the Basel 2 framework, credit risk for regulatory-capital purposes would 
be assessed either under the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach, under which approved 
banks could use their own internal rating systems to measure credit risk, or under the 
standardised approach, which would use external credit assessments. In the pre-Basel-2 
consultations, when the introduction of up-front recognition of expected losses for regulatory-
capital purposes first became a prominent issue, there was some debate about whether 
expected losses should be dealt with through the determination of required capital (i.e., as an 
addition to risk-weighted assets, the denominator of a regulatory-capital ratio) or through the 
measurement of actual capital (i.e., as a deduction from capital, the numerator of a 
regulatory-capital ratio). After objections to initial proposals to follow the former route, the 
latter route was eventually chosen (BCBS 2001a, b, BCBS 2003, BCBS 2004a Introduction). 
The resultant IRB approach in relation to loss allowances (termed here 'provisions') is 
described as follows in the Basel 2 framework document:  
Banks using the IRB (internal ratings-based) approach […] must compare (i) 
the amount of total eligible provisions, as defined in paragraph 380, with (ii) 
the total expected losses amount as calculated within the IRB approach and 
defined in paragraph 375. Where the total expected loss amount exceeds total 
eligible provisions, banks must deduct the difference. Deduction must be on 
the basis of 50% from Tier 1 and 50% from Tier 2. Where the total expected 
loss amount is less than total eligible provisions, as explained in paragraphs 
380 to 383, banks may recognise the difference in Tier 2 capital up to a 
maximum of 0.6% of credit risk-weighted assets. (BCBS 2006, paragraph 43) 
 
BCBS (2006, paragraph 43) also stated that, under the IRB approach, the Basel 1 treatment of 
general loan-loss allowances as part of Tier 2 capital would no longer be permitted. Under the 
Basel 2 standardised approach, the treatment of loan-loss allowances is as under Basel 1 
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(BCBS 2006, paragraph 42), whereby general loan-loss allowances are included in Tier 2 
capital up to a maximum of 1.25% of risk-weighted assets.
14
   
Under the Basel 3 accord, issued in 2010 and revised in 2011 (BCBS 2011), the 
deduction from capital in respect of a shortfall of the stock of provisions relative to expected 
losses under the IRB approach should be made entirely within Common Equity Tier 1 capital, 
which is part of Tier 1 capital (BCBS 2011, paragraph 73). Where the total expected loss 
amount is less than total eligible provisions, banks may recognise the difference in Tier 2 
capital up to a maximum of 0.6% of credit-risk-weighted assets (BCBS 2011, paragraph 61). 
Under the Basel 3 standardised approach, the treatment of loan-loss allowances is as under 
Basel 1 (BCBS 2011, paragraph 60). 
From the foregoing, it can be seen that, although the loan-loss allowances on banks' 
balance sheets are over-ridden in some ways by bank-regulators' adjustments to regulatory 
capital, loan-loss allowances affect regulatory capital. For example, for banks following the 
Basel standardised approach, the net-of-tax loss allowance recognised in the balance sheet 
reduces Tier 1 capital directly and the gross-of-tax general allowance increases Tier 2 capital 
up to a maximum of 1.25% of risk-weighted assets.
15
 Furthermore, even for IRB banks, for 
which a Basel 3 regulatory expected-loss estimate that exceeds the accounting allowance 
over-rides the allowance, movements in the allowance directly affect Tier 1 regulatory capital 
if the allowance exceeds the regulatory expected-loss estimate (Kruger et al. 2018, p. 116).
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Also, we note that, although bank regulators typically have the power to write their own rules 
that over-ride accounting rules in the measurement of regulatory capital, Ryan and Keeley 
(2013, p. 69) observed that U.S. bank regulators appeared unwilling to do so in relation to 





2.3. Literature review 
The IL methods for accounting for credit losses that were in place under U.S. GAAP and 
IFRS at the time of the financial and banking crisis of the late 2000s were more heavily 
weighted towards limiting earnings management and the associated overstatement of loss 
allowances than towards permitting discretion that might facilitate timely recognition in loss 
allowances of information about likely credit losses. In part in response to advice from a 
prudential-regulatory perspective, the crisis prompted a shift in relative emphasis away from 
the former and towards the latter. This was reflected in the development of new EL-based 
methods of accounting for credit losses.
17
 In this subsection, we review elements of the prior 
literature that are relevant to these features of the events examined in this paper. We structure 
our review such as to focus on (i) elements of the literature on earnings management and 
capital management in relation to banks and (ii) elements of the literature on accounting 
conservatism and timeliness in relation to banks, including in relation to stability of the 
financial system. See also Giner and Mora (2018) for further consideration of the issues 
considered in our review and related issues, in particular in relation to the academic literature 
on accounting conservatism. 
 
2.3.1. Elements of the literature on earnings management and capital management in 
relation to banks 
 
The restrictions of the IL method of accounting for credit losses, criticised at the time of the 
financial and banking crisis of the late 2000s, could be attributed in part to the understandable 
importance previously attached to the restriction of opportunities for manipulation of credit-
loss expense that might be undertaken for earnings-management purposes.  
There is a substantial body of evidence that such manipulation has occurred in order 
to manage either or both of earnings and regulatory capital.
18
 Moyer (1990) and Beatty et al. 
(1995) report evidence of loss-allowance-related regulatory-capital management in the U.S. 
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prior to the implementation of the first Basel accord (Basel 1), when U.S. loan-loss 
allowances had a greater regulatory-capital-increasing benefit than after implementation of 
Basel 1.
19
 Kim and Kross (1998) and Ahmed et al. (1999) report evidence that such capital 
management was reduced in the post-Basel period after the regulatory-capital benefit was 
reduced. Further evidence of loss-allowance-related earnings and/or capital management in 
the U.S. is reported in Collins et al. (1995), Lobo and Yang (2001), Kanagaretnam et al. 
(2003), Kanagaretnam et al. (2004) and Liu and Ryan (2006). Huizinga and Laeven (2012) 
examine U.S. banks' use of accounting discretion during the crisis. They report evidence that 
such discretion, including with respect to loan-loss expense, was used to overstate book 
values of financial assets during the crisis. In contrast, Jin et al. (2016) report evidence that 
U.S. banks' discretion with respect to loan-loss expense prior to the crisis was used primarily 
for risk-management purposes through provision for future credit losses rather than for 
earnings-management-related purposes. Evidence of loss-allowance-related earnings and/or 
regulatory-capital management has also been reported for Japan (Shrieves and Dahl 2003), 
Australia (Anandarajan et al. 2007) and Spain (Perez et al. 2008). Hasan and Wall (2004) 
report evidence of loss allowances being used to manage earnings in a large number of 
countries. A multi-national study by Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) reports that the use of 
loan-loss-related earnings smoothing varies predictably across countries in relation to factors 
including investor protection, disclosure, regulation and the degree of financial development. 
Another multi-national study by Bouvatier et al. (2014) reports that European banks with 
more concentrated ownership have used discretionary loan-loss expense to smooth their 
income, and that this effect is less strong in countries with stronger supervisory regimes that 
might be expected to limit opportunistic behaviour.  
 A number of studies focus on the trade-off between (i) constraints on discretion that 
might be used to manage earnings and (ii) facilitation of timely and informative reported 
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credit-losses. We have already referred to the evidence in Balla and Rose (2015) and in Beck 
and Narayanamoorthy (2013) that the strengthening of IL-recognition requirements in the 
U.S. in the early 2000s reduced earnings management but placed constraints on banks' timely 
recognition of loan losses. In a similar vein, Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011) find that 
the IL restriction imposed through the adoption of IAS 39 (IASB 2003) by European banks 
reduced the extent to which loan losses were used to manage earnings but resulted in less 
timely loan-loss recognition. They questioned the desirability of restricted discretion under 
IAS 39 in light of its possible adverse consequences during the financial and banking crisis of 
the late 2000s.
20
 Marton and Runesson (2017) also find evidence that, compared with pre-
existing local GAAP, IAS 39 reduced the timeliness of loan-loss expense in the European 
Union. They find that loan-loss expense under the IAS 39 IL method predicts future credit 
losses, as measured by charge-offs, to a lesser extent than under local GAAP, consistent with 
the IL model reducing the timeliness of loss recognition. They find that the comparative 
advantage of local GAAP is stronger (i) under strict enforcement, (ii) in larger banks, which 
are likely to benefit from relatively high levels of specialised skills and system support, and 
(iii) in relatively profitable banks, where incentives to manage earnings may be relatively 
low. They note that their results suggest that introduction of more discretionary EL methods 
will need to be supported by appropriate enforcement mechanisms. In relation to post-crisis 
proposals for more discretionary and forward-looking credit-loss-accounting methods, 
Bushman and Williams (2012) point to the risk that the benefits from reduced procyclicality 
arising from such methods may be swamped by losses in transparency. They report evidence 
that discretion in loan-loss provisioning that is used for timely loss recognition enhances 
discipline over bank risk-taking but that discretion in loan-loss provisioning that is used for 
earnings-smoothing purposes dampens that discipline. Acharya and Ryan (2016) argue that, 
absent banks' exercise of discretion, an EL model should provide earlier warning of economic 
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downturns than the IL model but that FASB (2012) would not suppress much if any volatility 
because it significantly broadens banks' discretion. Novotny-Farkas (2016) notes that the 
IFRS 9 EL model should have the beneficial effect of allowing earlier loss recognition and 
might enhance financial stability if it is implemented properly and consistently, but that the 
degree of discretion that it allows gives significant scope for earnings management. 
 The evidence summarised in this subsection indicates that there was some 
justification for standard setters to focus on restriction of earnings management in the credit-
loss accounting methods that they had in place prior to the crisis. It also indicates that there is 
reason to monitor the effects of the earnings-management opportunities created by the greater 
discretion permitted by the new EL methods relative to the pre-existing IL methods. 
  
2.3.2. Elements of the literature on accounting conservatism and timeliness in relation to 
banks  
 
During the standard setters' development of their EL methods of accounting for credit losses, 
a significant issue arose regarding the magnitude of loss allowances. As outlined in Section 1 
and described more fully later in the paper, a significant cause of the failure of FASB/IASB 
convergence on accounting for credit losses was that the IASB's preferred method for the 
determination of loss allowances was seen by the FASB as insufficiently conservative, in that 
allowances for credit losses would not be established soon enough, and the FASB's preferred 
method was seen by the IASB as excessively conservative, in that allowances for credit 
losses would be established too soon. We now consider elements of the literature that are 
relevant to this matter. We do so under the headings of 'Conditional and unconditional 
conservatism' and 'Association between timeliness in recognition of credit losses and stability 





2.3.2.1. Conditional and unconditional conservatism  
It might be argued that a conservative focus on loss-allowance adequacy, at the potential risk 
of over-stating those allowances, is beneficial to the extent that it allows the exercise of 
prudence under conditions of uncertainty, leading to timely recognition of new information 
about credit losses.
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 The type of news-dependent accounting conservatism envisaged here is 
sometimes termed 'conditional conservatism' (Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Beaver and Ryan 
2005). The beneficial effects of this type of conservatism have been extensively examined in 
the accounting literature through asymmetric-timeliness measures of the sort pioneered by 
Basu (1997), which measure the extent to which bad news is recognised in financial 
statements more quickly than good news. It might also be argued that a conservative focus on 
loss-allowance adequacy, at the potential risk of over-stating those allowances, is not 
beneficial to the extent that it might introduce a substantial level of bias that is not only 
uninformative in itself but might also limit the extent to which movements in loss allowances 
reflect new information. The type of news-independent accounting conservatism envisaged 
here contributes to what is sometimes termed 'unconditional conservatism' (Ball and 
Shivakumar 2005; Beaver and Ryan 2005). As the distinction between conditional 
conservatism and unconditional conservatism is of some relevance to the events examined in 
this paper, we review briefly in this subsection some elements of the literature relating to 
these concepts. 
There is much evidence in the general financial-reporting literature of the benefits of 
conditional conservatism. It has been found to be beneficial in addressing information-
asymmetry problems, including through acceleration in the triggering of debt-covenant 
violations (Zhang 2008), facilitation of access to debt markets thereby alleviating under-
investment (Garcia Lara et al. 2016), addressing information requirements of debtholders of 
near-insolvent companies (Aier et al. 2014) and constraining behaviour by managers that may 
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be detrimental to relatively uninformed outside equity investors (LaFond and Watts 2008). 
Beneficial effects of timely loss recognition documented in the general financial-reporting 
literature are also reflected in relation to financial institutions. Nichols et al. (2009) report 
evidence that, as predicted because of the greater information asymmetry that they face, 
public banks are more conditionally conservative than private banks. Vyas (2011) reports 
evidence that market prices of financial institutions reflect exposure to risky assets more 
quickly in the presence of timelier write-downs of those assets. Lim et al. (2015) report that 
conditional conservatism on the part of banks is associated with high reputation, enabling 
among other things the ability to charge higher interest to loan customers. Akins et al. (2017) 
find that timely loan-loss recognition constrains corruption in relation to banks' lending. 
Conditional conservatism can be contrasted with news-independent or unconditional 
conservatism. Unconditional conservatism typically arises in a number of ways, of which 
commonly quoted examples are: (i) for long-lived assets, the use of depreciation/amortisation 
rates that exceed the economic rates; (ii) for internally-generated intangible assets, immediate 
expensing of the costs of developing those assets. The non-recognition of growth options and 
of the present value of monopoly returns is sometimes also quoted as an example of 
unconditional conservatism, but some see this as different in character from the two items 
referred to above (Ryan 2006, Roychowdhury and Watts 2007). An effect of news-
independent unconditional conservatism can be to introduce uninformative bias that restricts 
the extent to which informationally-valuable news-dependent conditional conservatism can 
be applied. Ball and Shivakumar (2005, pp. 90-91) refer to this potentially adverse effect in 








2.3.2.2. Association between timeliness in recognition of credit losses and stability of the 
financial system 
 
Much of the evidence on the benefits of timely recognition of credit losses and resultant loss-
allowance adequacy relates to the stability of the financial system, which is of interest to 
prudential regulators. We consider this body of literature in the context of the consideration 
of the interest of prudential regulators in the issue of accounting for credit losses.  
It has been argued that prudential regulators have an asymmetric loss function 
because understated loss allowances may contribute to bank failure, with consequent severe 
costs to bank regulators, whereas overstated allowances are unlikely to impose severe costs 
on regulators (Benston and Wall 2005). Pressure from taxpayers who may have to meet the 
financial cost of bank failures is also likely to contribute to this effect (Wall and Koch 2000 
p. 15, Kane 1997). Prudential regulators might therefore be expected to be less averse to the 
overstatement of loss allowances than others with an interest in accounting for credit losses.  
Prudential regulators' interest in loss allowances arises both through their role in 
relation to regulatory capital and through other mechanisms. It is convenient to consider the 
regulatory-capital-related role of loss allowances in the context of the Basel 2 framework, 
referred to earlier. As noted previously, in relation to the framework's pillar 1 'Minimum 
Capital Requirements', loan-loss allowances on banks' balance sheets are an input to the 
calculation of Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital.  A number of studies report evidence that 
suggests that the direct effect of accounting for credit losses on regulatory capital, which 
could be characterised as a pillar-1-related effect, in combination with an asymmetric loss 
function could result in a preference on the part of prudential regulators for allowances that 
might be higher than the strict interpretation of accounting conceptual frameworks might 
give. Laeven and Majnoni (2003), Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) and Bouvatier and Lepetit 
(2008) provide consistent evidence that the lack of timeliness in loan-loss recognition under 
IL methods exacerbates economic downturns. These studies argue that IL methods prevent 
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banks from timely loan-loss recognition in good times and require banks to increase loss 
allowances substantially in bad times, which hits regulatory capital when it is expensive to 
raise capital. Beatty and Liao (2011) predict that, in light of likely concerns about regulatory-
capital constraints, banks with relatively untimely credit-loss recognition make relatively 
large reductions in their lending during recessions. Their results support this prediction. 
Bushman and Williams (2015) report that delayed loss recognition affects the stability of the 
banking system through the creation of codependence of downside tail risk among banks, 
with high-delay banks simultaneously facing in bad times financing frictions that will impede 
their access to new capital.  
The directional effect of mechanisms that could be characterised as relating to pillar 2 
'Supervisory Review Process' and pillar 3 'Market Discipline' on the preferences of prudential 
regulators with respect to loss allowances is less clear. In relation to loss allowances, these 
elements of the Basel framework contribute to the capital adequacy of banks by requiring that 
high-quality information should inform the determination of loss allowances and should be 
conveyed to market participants through those loss allowances. Relative to pillar-1-related 
channels, these channels might be more likely to induce a focus on faithful representation of 
losses, similar to that of accounting standard-setters, and might be less likely to motivate 
preferences for potentially overstated allowances. Ryan (2017) considers issues related to this 
matter. He argues that the effects of differences in methods of accounting for loan losses on 
regulatory capital ratios are likely to be relatively small: although loan-loss allowances may 
on average be a substantial proportion of equity (typically in the region of 10%), they are on 
average a small proportion of total assets (typically in the region of 1%).
23
 This suggests that 
regulatory-capital ratios, which express regulatory capital as a ratio of risk-weighted assets, 
are likely to be relatively insensitive to proportionate changes in loan-loss allowances. Based 
in part on such considerations, Ryan (2017) argues that, although there may be some effect 
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through regulatory-capital ratios, the primary effect of banks' loan-loss-accounting 
requirements on financial stability is less likely to arise directly through the direct regulatory-
capital-ratio channel than through the enhancement of the understanding of banks' risks on 
the part of the banks themselves, market participants and regulators. This argument suggests 
that accounting for loan losses may affect financial stability more strongly through channels 
related to the Basel pillars 2 and 3 than through the Basel pillar-1-related direct regulatory-
capital-ratio-related channel.  
Another mechanism by which the accounting for credit losses can influence stability 
is through its effect on banks' investing and funding decisions. As noted by Benston and Wall 
(2005) and Novotny-Farkas (2016), timely recognition of loan losses will reduce earnings 
and equity, which will themselves discourage risky behaviour with regard to investment and 
financing. 
Although prudential regulators can be expected to share to some extent the 
preferences of accounting standard setters that loss allowances should faithfully represent 
losses and although regulatory-capital ratios may not be very sensitive to proportionate 
changes in loan-loss allowances, there is reason to believe that asymmetric loss functions in 
combination with direct effects of loss allowances on regulatory capital referred to earlier 
might give prudential regulators a lower aversion to over-stated loss allowance than 
accounting standard setters have. 
 
3. The development since 2009 of the FASB's and the IASB's expected-loss-based 
methods of accounting for credit-loss impairment 
 
In the aftermath of the financial and banking crisis of the late 2000s, the FASB and the IASB 
each proceeded with the development of credit-loss impairment methods aimed at achieving 
more timely recognition of predictable losses.
24
 In this section, we outline the development 
between 2009 and 2016 of the FASB's and IASB's EL methods for accounting for 
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impairment relating to credit losses. We provide a summary and discussion for each of the 
sets of proposals issued by the standard setters. Our summaries and discussions are based on: 
(i) our review of FASB and IASB publications; (ii) our review of FASB and IASB meeting 
records and recordings of meetings; (iii) our confidential conversations with senior observers 
of the process; (iv) our reading of comment letters written in response to the five proposal 
documents issued by the FASB and/or the IASB between 2009 and 2013, of which discussion 
is informed by analysis reported in O'Hanlon et al. (2018).  
A representation of the timeline of key outputs is presented in Figure 1, which gives 
full titles of the outputs. For fuller details of the proposal documents, see the European 




3.1. IASB Exposure Draft: November 2009 (IASB 2009) 
 
IASB (2009) aimed to reflect the economics of lending. In particular, it aimed to avoid the 
problem whereby, under the pre-existing IL method, interest revenue was recognised in full 
from the origination of a loan but initially-expected losses that are compensated within the 
interest revenue were not recognised until loss events occur:  
The (IL) approach is internally inconsistent because expected losses are implicit in the 
initial measurement of the asset, but not taken into account in determining the effective 
interest rate used for subsequent measurement. This results in a systematic 
overstatement of interest revenue in the periods before a loss event occurs. In effect, 
subsequent impairment losses are in part reversals of inappropriate revenue recognition 
in earlier periods. (IASB 2009, paragraph BC11) 
 
The IASB (2009) method treated the transaction price (amount lent or purchase price) at 
which financial assets were initially recognised as being the present value of expected future 
cash inflows as at the initial-recognition date, net of future shortfalls relative to contractual 
cash flows (credit losses) expected as at that date, discounted at a credit-loss-inclusive 
integrated effective interest rate (hereinafter, IEIR). The IEIR would be used for accrual of 
interest revenue. Recognition of initially-expected credit losses would thereby be spread over 
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the expected life of assets. Subsequent revisions to expected cash flows, discounted at the 
initially-estimated IEIR, would then be recognised in full as they occurred. Figure 2 
represents this diagrammatically. Figure 3 includes a numerical illustration of the recognition 
of initially-expected credit losses under the IASB (2009) proposal. We and many observers 
with whom we spoke share the view expressed in the IASB's subsequent 2013 exposure draft 
that 'expected credit losses are most faithfully represented by the proposals in the 2009 ED. 
Those proposals reflected the economic link between the pricing of financial assets and the 
expected credit losses at initial recognition' (IASB 2013a, p. 10). Analysis of comment letters 
reported in O'Hanlon et al. (2018) indicates strong support for the general principle of 
spreading across time of the recognition of initially-expected credit losses. However, based 
on the IASB's own assessment of feedback referred to in IASB (2014a, paragraph BCIN.12), 
analysis of comment letters reported in O'Hanlon et al. (2018) and comments that the authors 
received from observers, it is evident that the IASB (2009) IEIR method was widely regarded 
as posing substantial challenges: it would be difficult for preparers to combine interest and 
credit-loss information; it would be difficult for users to interpret measures that combine 
interest and credit-loss information. Some comment letters also questioned whether assets are 
priced by reference to expected losses in the way implied by IASB (2009). Also, some 
respondents to IASB (2009)
26
 and some observers with whom we spoke noted that the 
smooth recognition of initially-expected credit losses over time in IASB (2009) is 
inconsistent with the uneven manner in which losses arise over time. 
In light of feedback on IASB (2009), the IASB then pursued a path aimed at 
achieving its objective 'to reflect initial expected credit losses as part of determining the 
effective interest rate' (FASB/IASB 2011a, paragraph IN5) through a method that was more 
practicable than that described in IASB (2009), including within its subsequent attempt to 




3.2. FASB Exposure Draft: 26 May 2010 (FASB 2010a)  
 
As indicated in its title, the FASB (2010a) exposure draft had a wider scope than IASB 
(2009), with credit-loss impairment being one of various financial-instrument issues that were 
addressed. With regard to credit losses, FASB (2010a) proposed that an entity should 
recognise credit impairment in net income 'when it does not expect to collect all contractual 
amounts due for originated financial asset(s) and all amounts originally expected to be 
collected upon acquisition for purchased financial asset(s)' (FASB 2010a, paragraph 38). 
Significant features of the FASB (2010a) proposals were that losses would no longer need to 
be 'probable' in order to be recognised and that it should be assumed that economic conditions 
at the impairment-measurement date would remain unchanged for the remaining life of assets 
held. An implication of FASB (2010a) was the requirement for full recognition at day 1 (i.e., 
at the time of initial recognition) of all credit losses expected over the contractual life of 
financial assets held. This treatment, which could be seen as an extreme form of 
unconditional conservatism, became a controversial issue later in the process. Figure 3 
includes a numerical illustration of recognition of day-1 loss and of why this might be seen as 
a problem. The FASB (2010a) proposals differed from the IASB (2009) proposals primarily 
in that, whereas the IASB proposals gave relatively high weight to income-recognition 




The FASB (2010a) method had much in common with the Current Expected Credit 
Loss (CECL) method subsequently included in the later FASB (2016) Accounting Standards 
Update on credit losses in that it removed the 'probable' threshold for loss recognition and in 
that it required loss-allowances to reflect all contractual amounts not expected to be collected 
for the remaining life of an asset. Despite its similarity to the eventual CECL EL method, it 
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was not at the time regarded by the FASB as an EL method. This was because, as stated in 
FASB (2010a, Paragraph BC175): 
[…] it would not permit an entity to forecast future events or economic 





Under an expected loss model, the Board understands that an entity would 
recognize a constant rate of credit impairments through the life of the financial 
asset based on expectations about losses on the date of acquisition or 
origination, with any changes from initial expected credit impairments 
recognized in the period of the change.  
 
Although for the reasons given above the FASB did not see the FASB (2010a) method as an 
EL method, neither did it see it as an IL method. This was 'because recognition of credit 
impairment would not be based on any triggering event' (FASB 2010a, Paragraph BC174). 
Despite what the FASB said about EL and IL in relation to the FASB (2010a) method, some 
respondents to FASB (2010a) interpreted the method as EL and some interpreted it as IL. 
Feedback on FASB (2010a) was largely supportive of dropping the requirement that 
losses should be 'probable' in order to be recognised and was largely unsupportive of the 
proposal that it should be assumed that economic conditions at the impairment-measurement 
date would remain unchanged for the remaining life of assets. In light of feedback on FASB 
(2010a), the FASB pursued a path aimed at achieving an objective 'to ensure that the 
allowance balance was sufficient to cover all estimated credit losses for the remaining life of 
an instrument' (FASB/IASB 2011a, paragraph IN6), including through its subsequent attempt 
with the IASB to develop a converged common solution. 
 
3.3. Joint FASB/IASB Supplementary Document: January 2011 (FASB/IASB 2011a) 
The joint FASB/IASB supplementary document presented an impairment method that the 
FASB and IASB believed would 'enable them to satisfy at least part of their individual 
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objectives for impairment accounting while achieving a common solution to impairment' 
(FASB/IASB 2011a, paragraph IN3). Specifically, it was hoped that the supplementary 
document would satisfy at least part of the primary objective of the IASB 'to reflect initial 
expected credit losses as part of determining the effective interest rate' and at least part the 
FASB objective 'to ensure that the allowance balance was sufficient to cover all estimated 
credit losses for the remaining life of an instrument' (FASB/IASB 2011a, paragraphs IN5-7). 
FASB/IASB (2011a) retained the FASB (2010a) elimination of the FASB's 'probable' 
threshold. Unlike IASB (2009), it proposed that initially-expected credit losses should be 
decoupled from the effective interest rate. Unlike IASB (2009) and FASB (2010a), it stated 
clearly that the information set to be used in estimating expected credit losses should include 
all available information including 'historical data, current economic conditions, and 
supportable forecasts of future events and economic conditions' (FASB/IASB 2011a, 
paragraph B5). The requirement to use an information set including supportable forecasts that 
is substantially broader than permitted by pre-existing IL methods was carried forward with 
similar wording into all subsequent FASB and IASB exposure drafts and standards on credit 
losses, together with the elimination of the FASB's 'probable' threshold. The standard setters' 
converged broadening of the information set permitted to be used for the purpose of 
recognising credit-loss impairment addresses an important element of the problem with the 
timeliness of the accounting for credit losses highlighted in the crisis.  
Another key proposal in the supplementary document was that, for the purpose of 
accounting for credit losses, financial assets should be categorised into a 'good book' and a 
'bad book'. At each reporting date, the impairment allowance would comprise:  
 for assets for which it is appropriate to recognise expected credit losses over time 
(good book), the higher of: (i) time-proportional expected credit losses (TPA), 
addressing through spreading of loss recognition over time the IASB's preference to 
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reflect the relationship between expected credit losses and pricing;
28
 and (ii) credit 
losses expected to occur within the foreseeable future period (at least twelve months) 
(FFP),  addressing the FASB's focus on loss-allowance adequacy; TPA can be seen as 
a spreading approach, which does not involve day-1 losses,
29
 and FFP can be seen as 
an immediate-recognition approach, which does involve day-1 losses; 
 for all other assets (bad book), the entire amount of expected credit losses.  
Assets would be included in and transferred between the good-book and bad-book categories 
in accordance with an entity's internal risk-management practices. 
 The joint FASB/IASB supplementary document elicited substantial numbers of 
responses from U.S. respondents that could be assumed to be FASB constituents and non-
U.S. respondents that could be assumed to be IASB constituents or potential constituents. 
This permitted direct comparison of responses for the two groups reported in O'Hanlon et al. 
(2018), for which some statistics are reproduced in Table 1.
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Table 1. Responses to comment letters on FASB/IASB (2011a) summarised from 
O'Hanlon et al. (2018) 
Proposed treatment Positive comment Negative comment 
 Non-U.S. U.S. Non-U.S. U.S. 
Categorisation into good book and bad book  82% 34% 10% 43% 
Good-book allowance: TPA 70% 18% 19% 64% 
Good-book allowance: FFP 32% 49% 52% 35% 
Note: These statistics relate to 111 non-U.S. respondents and 72 U.S. respondents. For each of the six pairs 
of statistics (non-U.S./U.S.) reported above, the difference between the proportion of non-U.S. respondents 
commenting in the stated way and the proportion of U.S. respondents commenting in the stated way is 
significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test).  
 
These statistics indicate differences between preferences of FASB and IASB constituents that 
might contribute to barriers to FASB/IASB convergence on accounting for credit losses. 
Non-U.S. respondents tended to favour good book/bad book categorisation consistent with a 
preference to recognise initially-expected losses on good-book assets over time, whereas U.S. 
respondents tended to oppose it. With regard to the good-book allowance, non-U.S. 
respondents tended to favour an income-statement-focused spreading approach (TPA), 
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whereas U.S. respondents tended to favour a balance-sheet-focused immediate-recognition 
approach (FFP) that would require day-1 losses.  
 
3.4. Continued Work on Seeking Convergence: The Three-Bucket Approach 
After receiving feedback on FASB/IASB (2011a), the FASB and the IASB continued in 2011 
and 2012 with joint deliberations aimed at developing a possible converged method of 
accounting for credit-loss impairment. Within these deliberations, the standard setters 
considered a so-called three-bucket approach (FASB/IASB 2011b) developed from the 
proposals in the supplementary document. Here, assets would be categorised into one of three 
buckets:  
 Bucket 1: assets that had not been affected by observable events indicating a direct 
relationship to possible future default, for which there would be partial recognition of 
expected losses, where options considered included TPA and 12-month expected 
losses;  
 Buckets 2 and 3: assets affected by events indicating a direct relationship to future 
default, with bucket 2 comprising groups of assets for which specific assets in danger 
of default had not been identified and bucket 3 comprising specific assets for which 
credit losses are expected to occur or have occurred, for which lifetime expected 
losses would be recognised. 
During their deliberations, the FASB and the IASB eliminated the TPA spreading approach 
from consideration. They agreed to deliberate a relative method in which all in-scope 
financial assets would initially be placed in bucket 1, for which the allowance at each date 
including day 1 would comprise 12-month expected loss, with any assets that suffered 
significant subsequent deterioration in credit quality relative to credit quality at initial 
recognition then being moved to lifetime expected loss. In that it involved recognition of 12-
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month expected losses for bucket-1 assets, this method was similar to the FASB's preferred 
FFP good-book method and did not explicitly involve spreading in the way that the IASB 
(2009) IEIR method or the TPA method did. However, the IASB accepted this method, with 
some conceptual misgivings with regard to day-1 losses, in part because it offered a 
practicable approximation to the outcomes from the IASB (2009) IEIR method and in part 
because it was hoped that this might facilitate FASB/IASB convergence.
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In August 2012, the FASB indicated that it did not wish to continue to work with the 
IASB towards development of a method based on the three-bucket categorisation of financial 
assets into a non-credit-deteriorated category and a credit-deteriorated category with only 
partial recognition of expected credit losses for the first category, which it termed a 'dual-
measurement' approach. After the FASB's August 2012 decision, the FASB and the IASB 
proceeded to develop their own separate standards while continuing to consult with each 
other. In subsequent explanation in FASB (2012, paragraph BC11) of its decision to 
disengage from the three-bucket deliberations with the IASB, the FASB said that application 
of two different measurement objectives would be confusing for users, would involve a 'cliff 
effect' as assets were reclassified, would create earnings-management opportunities, and 
could be seen as involving an undesirable IL-type recognition trigger. Although we are not 
aware of evidence of a direct connection between the two events, we note that the August 
2012 FASB meeting occurred only a few weeks after the publication of an SEC document 
(SEC 2012) that was viewed by the IASB Chair Hans Hoogervorst as signalling the end of 
the era of IASB/FASB convergence (McEnroe and Sullivan 2014, p. 18).
32
 
The difference between the pre-existing practices of banks in the U.S. and elsewhere 
with regard to loss-allowances, which would contribute to the eventual failure of the FASB 
and IASB to achieve a common solution to accounting for credit losses, had been reflected in 
discussion at a joint FASB/IASB meeting in July 2011.
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 At that meeting, there was both 
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concern from the IASB side that recognition of a 12-month good-book (bucket-1) allowance 
at initial recognition was excessive and concern from the FASB side that a 12-month good-
book allowance was insufficient. At that meeting an IASB member questioned how a day-1 
loss on assets originated at fair value could provide useful information to users of financial 
statements. A FASB representative indicated that the FASB might not wish to adopt a 
method for accounting for credit losses that reduced allowances: 'I start with the belief that 
there has to be some change here. Reserves generally have been inadequate in the U.S. 
banking system'. He said that he had conducted analysis that indicated that a 12-month 
bucket-1 allowance would have virtually no impact on loss allowances of U.S. commercial 
banks and might even reduce them. In response, an IASB representative noted that this was a 
U.S.-bank perspective and would not be expected to hold outside the U.S.  
 Further illustration of the tensions caused by the differences in pre-existing practice 
with regard to allowances that had contributed to the failure of the FASB and the IASB to 
agree a common three-bucket-based solution is given by discussion at an IASB meeting of 
October 2012.
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 Here reference to allowance levels is linked to concerns of bank regulators. 
At that meeting, an IASB member referred to the following passage in an IASB feedback-




The prudential regulators have not expressed a formal opinion on the three-bucket 
model at this stage. However, their preliminary feedback was mixed. Some, particularly 
in the U.S., favour a lifetime expected loss model. This is primarily because they fear 
that the three-bucket approach may actually reduce allowance balances relative to those 
recognised today. Some were concerned that the three-bucket model, unless more 
clearly articulated, could enable entities to avoid recognising lifetime expected losses 
on a timely basis.  
 
An IASB staff member said that this paragraph reflected U.S. bank regulators' concern that, 
because of the way in which U.S. banks used IBNR-type loss provisioning in their current 
application of SFAS 5 (FASB 1975), the application of a three-bucket method in the U.S. 
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might result in a reduction of allowance balances relative to their then-current levels. Another 
IASB staff member then commented as follows:  
That's very U.S.-specific. The feedback we have had from our constituents outside the 
U.S. is that, based on their analysis of the model [….], there would be an increase in 
provisions based on the three-bucket model and, in some cases, a very significant 
increase in provisions. And that is one of the tensions […] that we have had all the way 
through this project in that the starting places of the banks in different parts of the 
world are so different. This puts a lot of pressure on our ability to come to a converged 
solution. 
 
We note that the concerns of bank regulators referred to above are consistent with the 
direction that might be predicted based on our discussion in subsection 2.3.2.2. 
Allowance-adequacy-related concerns of the FASB with regard the three-bucket 
proposals were also reflected by a FASB representative at a joint FASB/IASB meeting in 
July 2013: it had been estimated that the three-bucket approach favoured by the IASB would 
reduce U.S. allowances by about 15% whereas the FASB preferred 'single-measurement' 
approach, under which full-contractual-life expected credit losses would be recognised, 
would increase them by about 40%.
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From the above, it can be seen that, by the later stages of the process, the seriousness 
of the challenge posed by the difference between pre-existing practice with regard to loss-
allowances in the U.S. and elsewhere was well recognised. Related to this, it is notable that 
the FASB and U.S. prudential regulators tended to see pre-existing U.S. GAAP as giving rise 
to insufficiently timely recognition of credit losses and inadequate loss allowances,
37
 and 
feared that the measures that were proposed by the IASB to improve matters in this regard 
might make matters worse in the U.S.  
We did not note evidence from meeting records that differences between the IASB 
and the FASB with respect to pre-existing accounting standards or with respect to conceptual 
reasoning were a major source of the FASB/IASB differences. In relation to this, the FASB 
and IASB had issued in 2010 identical conceptual framework chapters entitled 'Qualitative 
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characteristics of useful financial information', which referred to matters including 'bias' and 
'neutrality' that are highly relevant to this issue (FASB 2010b, IASB 2010). Furthermore, as 
noted below, an IASB member in the final IASB exposure draft (IASB 2013a) and two FASB 
members in the final FASB standard (FASB 2016) raised very similar conceptually-based 
objections to day-1 losses later in the process. 
  
3.5. IASB Exposure Draft: March 2013 (IASB 2013a) and IFRS 9: July 2014 (IASB 
2014a) 
 
The IASB decided at a December 2012 meeting to issue a new exposure draft incorporating a 
three-bucket approach. This was subsequently issued in March 2013 (IASB 2013a).
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Discussion at the December 2012 meeting indicated that a major cause of the IASB's 
objection to the FASB's preferred method was its understanding of the likely magnitude of 
the FASB's lifetime day-1 losses, which were expected to be substantially larger than the 
IASB's 12-month day-1 losses. The following comment from the Chair of the IASB at the 
December 2012 meeting illustrates that IASB members acknowledged the conceptual flaw 
with the 12-month allowance and associated day-1-loss, and that this feature had initially 
been accepted by the IASB in part because it might have assisted with convergence with the 
FASB which was no longer expected to occur as part of the then-current process:
39
  
[…] I do recollect that the whole board had a severe hiccup about this 12-month day-1 
loss. We didn't like it because it is conceptually flawed, and we know that, but we were 
willing to […] take that, first of all because we were in the process of reaching some 
kind of convergence with the FASB. Well, that moment has unfortunately passed, but 
we were where we were and it was not very simple to come up with a simple and better 
solution for this issue […] There are conceptual issues. Fortunately, quantitatively our 
conceptual flaw is a lot smaller than […] the current FASB proposal […]. 
 
Despite the conceptual concerns with the 12-month day-1 allowance, there did not appear to 
be any appetite at that stage to re-open consideration of other approaches that would have 
delayed progress towards the issue of a final standard, and IASB (2013a) was issued on the 
basis that it was likely to result in the approximate achievement of the aim of IASB (2009) to 
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recognise initially-expected credit losses over time. Assets were described as being in one of 
three 'stages' with regard to credit deterioration, where stages 1, 2 and 3 corresponded closely 
to buckets 1, 2, and 3 from the three-bucket proposals. The stages are as follows:  
 Stage 1 assets: assets for which credit quality has not deteriorated significantly since 
initial recognition or that have low credit risk at the reporting date. 12-month expected 
losses are recognised, including at day 1, and interest is calculated based on the gross 
carrying amount before deducting the loss allowance;
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 Stage 2 assets: assets for which credit quality has deteriorated significantly since initial 
recognition, unless they have low credit risk at the reporting date, but for which there is 
no objective evidence of a credit-loss event. Full lifetime expected credit losses are 
recognised, with interest calculated on the gross carrying amount before deducting the 
loss allowance;  
 Stage 3 assets: assets for which there is objective evidence of impairment. Full lifetime 
expected credit losses are recognised, with interest calculated on the carrying amount of 
the asset after deducting the loss allowance.   
One board member's concern about the 12-month allowance with its day-1 loss requirement 
for stage-1 assets was expressed as follows within an alternative view published within IASB 
(2013a):  
the loss allowance at an amount equal to 12-month expected credit losses 
would result in a credit loss at initial recognition even when a financial asset is 
priced on market terms and where, consequently, no economic credit loss 
exists […] In no other area of financial reporting is an allowance immediately 
established to reduce the value of an asset that is purchased or originated on 
market terms. (IASB 2013a, paragraph AV2) 
 
As reported in O'Hanlon et al. (2018), non-U.S. responses to IASB (2013a) included a 
substantial amount of negative comment on the day-1-loss requirement, much of which 
referenced supportively the alternative view published within the exposure draft. There was 
also some concern about operational practicability of the transfer criterion from the 12-
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month-loss category to the lifetime-loss category. However a substantial majority of 
respondents regarded the 12-month loss allowance for stage-1 assets together with transfer to 
lifetime loss after significant-deterioration in credit quality as an acceptable approach. At an 
IASB meeting of September 2013, an IASB member noted the apparent contradiction in the 
fact that a large number of respondents to IASB (2013a) had said that the 12-month 
allowance was both conceptually unjustified and acceptable.
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IFRS 9 (IASB 2014a) incorporated the key proposals of IASB (2013a), including the 
three stages and the 12-month loss allowance (including at day 1) for stage-1 assets.
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 It noted 
that the recognition of 12-month expected losses for assets for which credit risk has not 
increased significantly since initial recognition was a cost-benefit-based operational 
simplification for dealing with expected losses on good-book assets (IASB 2014a, paragraph 
BC5.195). It included a requirement that measurement of expected credit losses should reflect 
a broadened information set that includes 'reasonable and supportable information that is 
available without undue cost or effort at the reporting date about past events, current 
conditions and forecasts of future economic conditions' (IASB 2014a, paragraph 5.5.17). No 
dissenting opinion on the 12-month allowance and its day-1 loss was included in IFRS 9 
(IASB 2014a). 
 It remains to be seen whether day-1-loss becomes a significant problem in years after 
IASB (2014a) has become effective. 
 
3.6. FASB Exposure Draft: December 2012 (FASB 2012) and FASB Accounting 
Standards Update No. 2016-13: June 2016 (FASB 2016) 
 
The FASB (2012) exposure draft was issued in December 2012. It proposed 'only one 
measurement approach, which is the current estimate of contractual cash flows not expected 
to be collected on financial assets held at the reporting date' (FASB 2012, p. 5). FASB (2012) 
was developed into the Accounting Standards Update (FASB 2016) containing the CECL 
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method. This requires that the allowance for expected credit losses is 'a valuation account that 
is deducted from the amortised cost basis of the financial asset(s) to present the net amount 
expected to be collected on the financial asset' (FASB 2016, paragraph 326-20-30-1). FASB 
(2016) included a requirement that measurement of expected credit losses should reflect a 
broadened information set: 'an entity shall consider available information relevant to 
assessing the collectibility of cash flows. This information may include internal information, 
external information, or a combination of both relating to past events, current conditions, and 
reasonable and supportable forecasts' (FASB 2016, paragraph 326-20-30-7). 
Difficulties in achieving a shared understanding between the FASB and financial-
statement preparers with regard to what is required by CECL appeared to contribute to the 
substantial time that elapsed between FASB (2012) and FASB (2016). As reported in 
O'Hanlon et al. (2018), responses to FASB (2012) indicate that a high proportion of U.S. 
respondents had concerns about the practicability of estimation and interpretability of 
allowances covering expected losses over the whole life of assets and with regard to the 
requirement to recognise such allowances at day 1. In response to feedback reflecting concern 
about the difficulty of estimating expected losses over the whole contractual life of assets, the 
FASB acknowledged that it may not have explained the CECL forecasting requirements very 
well in FASB (2012),
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 and it took steps to allay concern about these. It emphasised in its 
final standard that: 
for periods beyond which the entity is able to make or obtain reasonable and 
supportable forecasts of expected credit losses, an entity shall revert to 




The day-1-loss feature became a focus of a dissenting opinion by two FASB 
members. They referred to the belief of some commentators that: 
the incremental loss that would be recognized […] is not based on the 
economics of the transaction but rather on a prudential desire to have a higher 
level of loan loss reserves reflected in financial reports to investors. (FASB 




Using similar language to that of the IASB (2013a) alternative view, they questioned the 
conceptual soundness of day-1 loss:  
They are unaware of any other area of financial reporting for which a loss and 
a related valuation allowance are immediately established to reduce the value 
of a recognized asset that is purchased or originated on market terms. (FASB 
2016, p. 237) 
 
It remains to be seen what problems may arise after FASB (2016) has become 
effective in relation to the requirement to estimate expected losses over the whole life of 
financial assets held and the requirement to recognise such expected losses in full at day 1. 
 
3.7. Involvement of regulators in the process 
 
Subsection 2.1.4 refers to preferences from regulatory-related sources for the development of 
accounting standards that would give more timely recognition of credit losses. It is useful at 
this point to comment on the involvement of regulators in the process described in this 
section. It is evident from our examination of meeting records that financial and banking 
regulators were consulted throughout the process.
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 As might be expected based on our 
review in subsection 2.3.2.2 of issues related to timely recognition of losses and the stability 
of the financial system, regulators tended to prefer relatively conservative approaches. This is 
exemplified by the reference in subsection 3.4 above to regulators' concern that three-bucket-
based allowances might be inadequate. It is also exemplified by a similar concern on the part 
of prudential regulators reflected in an IASB outreach summary in respect of IASB (2013a).
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Financial and banking regulators submitted comment letters in respect of all five proposal 
documents referred to above.
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 In the relatively small number of letters from financial and 
banking regulators in response to FASB (2012) and IASB (2013a) examined by O'Hanlon et 






4. Problems that may arise when the standards become effective: lifetime losses and 
day-1 losses 
 
The standard setters have moved relatively straightforwardly to a converged broadening of 
the information set that is permitted to be used in estimating credit losses that can be 
recognised in financial statements. Instead of the relatively restricted information set 
permitted by pre-existing IL methods, both standard setters permit the use of an information 
set that, without the pre-existing FASB 'probable' threshold, includes reasonable and 
supportable forecasts (IASB 2014a paragraph 5.5.17, FASB 2016 paragraph 326-20-30-7). 
This directly addresses a major element of the problem with the lack of timeliness in credit-
loss recognition that gave rise to concern in the wake of the financial and banking crisis of 
the late 2000s. However, this very positive outcome was achieved within a lengthy process 
that also resulted in what some regard as less desirable outcomes. O'Hanlon et al. (2018) 
report that comment letters written in response to the standard setters' final exposure drafts 
suggest two particular issues that may give rise to problems when the standards become 
effective.  
First, the FASB's requirement that loss allowances at each date should recognise all 
credit losses expected to occur over the whole life of assets gave rise to a high level of 
concern, in particular with regard to practicability of implementation. An illustration of this 
type of concern was provided at a FASB roundtable meeting of 4 February 2016. At that 
meeting, Community Bank representatives expressed strong concern arising from their 
understanding that the FASB's requirement within the CECL method for estimation of 
expected losses over the whole life of assets would require them to use complex and costly 
models that would be of no incremental value within their businesses. As noted above, the 
FASB has made substantial effort to address the causes of such concern.  
Recent literature includes some suggestion that the requirement to recognise full-
contractual-life expected losses in a U.S. context may not be as big a problem as it might first 
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appear and may have a beneficial effect. Wu (2016) argues that the level of sales, 
prepayments and defaults in the U.S. context may mean that the time that loans are expected 
to remain within lenders' loan books may be substantially shorter than their full contractual 
life. Although this does not eliminate the requirement to estimate losses over the full 
contractual life of loans,
49
 it may mean that the task of forecasting such losses is facilitated by 
the ability to assume that losses beyond a certain point will be minimal. Giner and Mora 
(2018) argue that a requirement to recognise full-contractual-life expected losses could be 
beneficial in the U.S. context, in which the originate-to-distribute business model is relatively 
common. Such a requirement might be expected to achieve the timely recognition of credit 
losses that are expected to arise years after disposal/distribution and that might not be 
recognised in a timely manner before disposal/distribution under the IASB's 12-month 
expected-loss approach. Giner and Mora (2018) argue that the requirement may consequently 
have the beneficial effect in the U.S. context of discouraging excessively risky lending.  
Second, both standard setters have introduced requirements to recognise at day 1 
initially-expected losses on assets originated or acquired at fair value.
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 The problem with 
day-1 loss is illustrated in Figure 3, referred to previously. There are various ways in which 
this problem can be expressed. Examples are listed below with, in each case, an endnote 
reference to a comment letter expressing the problem in that way: 
1. Writing an asset down to below fair value immediately on initial recognition appears to 
be inconsistent with the standard setters' conceptual frameworks which require faithful 
representation of the phenomena that are purported to be represented.
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2. In that they are reflected both in the numerator and the denominator of a discounted-
cash-flow (DCF) calculation, initially-expected losses are counted twice. See Figure 3. 
This is similar to the error that might arise if one were to discount a risk-adjusted stream 





3. Assuming that the pre-day-1-loss book value of an originated asset is equal to fair value 
at the origination date, this book value already recognises origination-date expectations 
regarding the amount and timing of shortfalls relative to contractual cash flows. These 
expectations should not be recognised again at the origination date.
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4. Recognising credit losses at origination but recognising associated credit-premium-
inclusive interest later does not reflect the economics of the lending transaction.
56
  
5. The requirement to write risky loans down to below fair value at the origination date 
suggests possibilities for earnings management, for example by originating a portfolio 
of risky loans in one period (in which a day-1 loss would be recognised) in the 
expectation of disposing of it at fair value in a subsequent period (in which the day-1 
loss would be reversed).
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 See subsection 2.3.1 for evidence that banks have used credit 
losses to manage earnings where opportunities arose. 
Furthermore, it was noted as part of the standard-setting process, including in the FASB's 




The standard setters' introduction of the requirement to recognise credit losses at day 
1 could be seen as a form of unconditional conservatism, which as noted in subsection 2.3.2.1 
can have the adverse effect of restricting the extent to which informationally-valuable news-
dependent conditional conservatism can be applied. Compared with other unconditionally 
conservative treatments, recognition of initially-expected losses at day 1 could be seen as 
relatively extreme. It appears similar to the application of an extreme form of accelerated 
depreciation under which all of the depreciation expected to be recognised over the life of an 
asset is recognised immediately on acquisition. 
Although there is a widespread view that the recognition of day-1 losses is not 
conceptually justified, a number of U.S.-based observers with whom we discussed this issue 
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suggested that recognition of day-1 loss can give reasonable outcomes. Rationales for this 
view included the following. These rationales were also reflected either in comment letters, to 
which we provide an endnote reference to an example in each case, or in the academic 
literature: 
1. Losses tend to occur early in the life of a loan.59 Although they do not typically occur at 
day 1, day-1 recognition is consistent to some extent with the early incidence of losses. 
Concerns about whether day 1 or some other time is the right time to recognise losses 
may sometimes derive from unrealistic beliefs about the accuracy with which the timing 
of losses can be predicted. This argument holds particularly in the case of large open 
portfolios.  
2. Once a bank makes a loan, it takes on the exposure to the risk of losses inherent in the 
loan. In the interests of having an appropriately prudently-stated balance sheet at the 
possible cost of a less informative income statement, it is desirable to recognise losses 
at the outset.
60
 This argument is related to the following argument made by the FASB in 
its justification of the recognition of losses at origination within a response to a 
'frequently asked question':61 
When an entity originates a loan, that entity has increased its exposure to credit 
losses. Likewise, when a contractual payment is received in full from the 
borrower, the entity's exposure to credit loss has decreased. The Board believes 
that recognizing all expected credit losses in the balance sheet causes the income 
statement to appropriately reflect the economic phenomenon that has occurred - 
namely, the extent to which an entity has increased or decreased its exposure to 
credit risk during the period. 
 
3. Related to the previous point, with imperfect information and in particular in good 
economic times, amounts lent may exceed the fair value of the expected future cash 
receipts from the loan. A limited element of day-1 loss may help deal with this. This 
argument has some similarity to an argument by a U.S. bank regulator from the 1990s 
referred to by Wall and Koch (2000, p. 9): bad loans tend to be made in good times, and 
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it is therefore appropriate to establish loss allowances in good times in order to cover 
the as-yet-unidentified losses that will subsequently be revealed. 
Concern about day-1 loss is raised primarily with reference to the FASB's CECL 
method, for which expected losses over the full contractual term of financial assets have to be 
recognised at day 1. The issue also arises with IFRS 9 (IASB 2014a). However, it is 
important to note that the FASB's rationale for including a day-1 loss allowance was different 
from that of the IASB. The 'frequently asked question' response quoted above suggests that 
the FASB believed that reflecting initially-expected losses at day 1, which is easily justified 
for the purpose of determining banks' capital requirements, is also the conceptually correct 
thing to do for the purpose of measuring credit-loss expense and loss allowances in financial 
statements. In contrast, it appears that IASB's introduction of a day-1-loss requirement was 
not based on a belief that recognition of day-1 loss was conceptually correct. As noted earlier 
in our subsection 3.5, the IASB's day-1-loss requirement appears to have been introduced 
because it was believed to provide a practicable approximation to the recognition of initially-
expected losses over the life of financial assets and because, at the time at which the IASB 
had initially decided to accept this approach, it was believed that this might facilitate 
FASB/IASB convergence.  
Overall, it appears difficult to justify day-1 loss on conceptual grounds. One possible 
justification is that it provides a practicable approximation to the outcomes from a 
conceptually more justifiable spreading-based approach. Another might be conservatism. 
However, as indicated above, day-1 loss is an example of unconditional conservatism, which 






5. Was expected-loss the best route to improvement of accounting for credit losses? 
Evidence of the perceived major nature of the change involved in introducing an EL method 
can be found in the statement in a letter of 13 January 2016 to the FASB Chair from the 




As we have noted above, a notable achievement of the two standard setters was their 
converged broadening of the information set used to measure credit-loss impairment, such 
that it includes reasonable and supportable forecasts and is not subject to a 'probable' 
threshold. Subject to caveats about opportunities that this might create for earnings and 
capital management, on which prior evidence was reviewed in subsection 2.3.1, this should 
have a significant beneficial effect with respect to timeliness in the accounting recognition of 
information about credit losses, which was a major focus of criticism in the aftermath of the 
financial and banking crisis of the late 2000s.
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 In this subsection, we raise the question of 
whether the improvement in the timeliness of credit-loss recognition, including through 
broadening of the information set permitted to be used, could have been achieved more 
straightforwardly and in a more converged manner through an alternative route to the type of 
EL route that the standard setters followed.  
 
5.1. Is there a clearly understood distinction between incurred loss and expected loss?  
Our study of events since 2009 leads us to the view, similar to that reflected in the study by 
Camfferman (2015) to which we referred previously, that there appears not to be a clear and 
widely-shared understanding of the distinguishing features of an EL method relative to an IL 
method in relation to accounting for credit losses. Observations that contribute to this view 
are as follows:  
50 
 
1. As noted in subsection 3.4 above, FASB documents reported the claim that the principle 
within the three-bucket EL method for determining whether an asset should be moved to 
the lifetime-loss category could be seen as introducing an IL trigger. Although some 
observers with whom we spoke feel that this claim is unfair, it illustrates the potential 
difficulty in distinguishing between IL methods and EL methods.  
2. Some respondents to FASB (2010a) saw the FASB (2010a) method as an EL method, 
some respondents saw it as an IL method and, as noted in our subsection 3.2, the FASB 
itself saw it as neither. 
3. The rationales for the FASB (2010a) impairment method not being seen by the FASB at 
the time as an EL method included that it would not spread recognition of initially-
expected losses over time. However, such a feature was also absent from the FASB's own 
final EL (CECL) method in FASB (2016), which dealt with expected losses through full 
recognition at each reporting date without any spreading procedure. 
4. At the FASB roundtable meeting of 4 February 2016, a Community Bank representative 
described what he saw as an acceptable more forward-looking adaptation ('tweak') of the 
pre-existing IL method. FASB representatives commented that the process described by 
the Community Bank representative was an example of an implementation of the CECL 
EL method.  
Drawing on the above and our reading of comment letters, we have observed a number of 
views with regard to the distinguishing feature of an EL method relative to an IL method. 
Some understand that a distinguishing feature of EL is simply that impairment is based on 
expected cash flows or expected losses. Some understand that a distinguishing feature is that 
impairment is based on expected cash flows and expected losses where expectations are 
derived from an information set that can include forecasts of future events and economic 
conditions. Some understand that a distinguishing feature is that recognition of initially-
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expected losses is spread over the life of assets. The observation that the term 'expected loss' 




5.2. Preferences for a route other than expected loss 
Examination of comment letters on the standard setters' various proposal documents since 
2009 indicates that some prominent respondents have continued to express a preference for 
the retention of an IL approach, typically in a modified form with a broadening of the 
information set that might be used as a basis for recognition of credit-loss impairment. For 
example, the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA), which is one of the 
UK's major accounting bodies, said in its comment letter in response to IASB (2013a) that:
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ACCA would prefer to retain the current incurred loss model which is less 
subjective and does contain a clear principle that can be applied across the 
piece. An incurred loss model in the new IFRS 9 however should be modified 
from the present IAS 39 version, by making it clear that losses that have been 
incurred but have not yet been reported as defaults should be recognised and 
that losses can occur before debtors actually default on repayments. 
 
Also, the ABA has provided detailed comment along similar lines. In its comment letter of 14 
May 2013 on the FASB (2012) exposure draft, the ABA said that, among other things, CECL 
will: 'require enormous and costly operational change, and potentially wreak havoc with 
FASB's own conceptual framework of accounting'. The ABA then went on to state its 
preference for a proposed modified IL model termed the Banking Industry Model (BIM):
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The BIM (initially introduced in 2011) is the best path toward an 
internationally converged solution that responds to concerns of bankers, bank 
investors, and banking regulators by: 
 Discontinuing the "probable loss" notion. 
 Providing appropriate guidance in understanding the loan impairment 
process, "loss events," and "forward-looking loss events," as well as 
additional disclosures to assist users in understanding the processes and 
comparing them between companies. 




 Retaining impairment accounting within the FASB conceptual framework 
by recognizing impairment only when a loss event is believed to have 
occurred. 
 Building on current systems and financial metrics, rather than wholesale 
change. 
 
The BIM referred to above had previously been described in an appendix to the ABA's 
comment letter of 11 March 2011 in response to the 2011 supplementary document. The 
ABA introduced its BIM as follows:
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We believe that the fundamental principles inherent in the incurred loss model 
are sound and have served the industry, regulators and financial statement 
users effectively by providing a well understood framework to determine 
credit-related allowances. However, over time, the incurred loss model has 
increasingly been interpreted in a way that has resulted in a significant flaw: 
allowance calculations based on too narrow a view of the credit cycle. History 
has shown that the credit profile of financial instruments is highly cyclical, 
typically with a period of benign loss activity that coincides with the 
expansion and peak of overall economic activity and credit availability, 
followed by a shorter and more concentrated period of elevated credit losses. 
Narrow interpretations and application of the incurred loss model result in the 
compression of this cycle by considering only losses estimated over an 
abbreviated loss emergence period and restricting the use of market trends and 
other data that would indicate changes in the probability or severity of loss 
until such deterioration is observable. The events of the recent financial crisis 
put a spotlight on this weakness in the application of the incurred loss model, 
resulting in the criticism noted above. Although we believe the fundamental 
principles of the incurred loss model remain sound, some thoughtful and 
tailored changes are necessary to incorporate the cyclical behavior of financial 
instruments and lack of transparency around inherent losses prior to the 
deterioration of the credit environment. 
 
The BIM is then described as comprising two components:  
(1) A base component (the "Base Component") that represents the estimate of 
expected inherent losses in the portfolio that are reasonably predictable;  
(2) A credit risk adjustment component (the "CRA") that represents additional 
credit losses that are not yet reflected in current credit risk metrics used to 
estimate the Base Component but are estimated using macro-level factors 
and are expected to emerge with more transparency as the credit cycle 
unfolds.' 
 
The second item is similar to items denoted 'incurred but not reported' in IAS 39 (IASB 2003, 
paragraph AG90). The preference referred to above for a broader application of the IL 
method is echoed in comment letters on FASB (2012) and IASB (2013a) examined by 
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O'Hanlon et al. (2018).
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 The claim that the IL method was being applied in an insufficiently 
conservative manner prior to the crisis is reminiscent of the point that was made in SFAS 114 
(FASB 1993a, paragraph 10) and quoted in our subsection 2.1.1 about the desirability of 
avoiding insufficiently conservative application of SFAS 5 (FASB 1975).  
 
5.3. An alternative way of approaching the improvement of accounting for credit losses? 
In this subsection, we raise the question of whether the EL route was the best route to follow 
for the purpose of improving the accounting for credit losses. 
We first offer our own view of how the terms 'incurred' and 'expected' might relate to 
each other in the context of accounting for credit losses: 
i. Any method of accounting for credit losses must use a current (as at the loss-
recognition date) information set of some sort; 
ii. Any method of accounting for credit losses operates in a setting in which financial 
assets were originally recognised at a transaction price (amount lent or purchase price) 
that can normally be expected to have reflected expectations at the initial-recognition 
date of future shortfalls relative to contractual cash inflows;  
iii. The information set referred to in (i) is used, explicitly or implicitly, to make 
estimates of expected future cash flows (or shortfalls relative to contractual or 
previously expected amounts) and risk in relation to a financial asset or financial 
assets;  
iv. These estimates are used, explicitly or implicitly, to arrive at an appropriate carrying 
value for a financial asset or financial assets;  
v. The appropriate carrying value is then compared with the pre-existing carrying value 
of the asset or assets to establish what loss if any has been incurred and should be 
recognised as an impairment within a loss allowance. 
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In this representation, in which the terms 'expected' and 'incurred' both appear, IL/EL is not a 
key distinguishing feature. We believe that more meaningful distinguishing features are as 
follows:  
1. (In item (i)) The information set that is permitted to be used. This could be a restricted 
information set comprising events and evidence of the sort permitted within pre-existing 
so-called IL methods, for which the link to estimates is relatively direct and provides 
relatively precise estimates of impairment. Alternatively, it could be a broader 
information set comprising events and evidence of the sort permitted within pre-existing 
so-called IL methods plus reasonable and supportable impairment-measurement-date 
forecasts of subsequent events and economic conditions, for which the link to estimates 
is relatively less direct and may provide estimates of impairment that are relatively less 
precise and that are relatively vulnerable to earnings management.  
2. (In item (ii)) The treatment of initially-expected shortfalls relative to contractual cash 
inflows. The initial carrying value of any financial asset (amount lent or purchase price) 
will reflect expectations at the initial-recognition date of future shortfalls relative to 
contractual cash inflows. All impairment methods, whether they are described as IL or 
EL or anything else, have to deal in some way with such initially-expected shortfalls 
(initially-expected losses). One possible approach to dealing with this issue would be to 
recognise the initially-expected shortfalls at the time of the initial recognition of the 
asset. A second possible approach would be to spread the initially-expected shortfalls 
across the life of the asset alongside the accrual of interest. Both of these approaches 
have been proposed within EL methods in recent years. The first was adopted within 
FASB (2016) and, for a subset of the initially-expected shortfalls, in IASB (2014a). 
However, although it may be consistent with the way in which bank regulators require 
expected losses on exposures to be reflected for the purpose of determining banks' 
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capital requirements, this approach is not easily justified for the purpose of measuring 
credit-loss expense and loss allowances in financial statements. The second was 
proposed in IASB (2009) but was not adopted, mainly due to claimed implementation 
problems. A third possible approach, which is the traditional approach adopted within 
IL methods, is to recognise such initially-expected shortfalls during the life of the 
assets, alongside shortfalls that were not initially expected, as part of impairments 
triggered when specified conditions, such as the occurrence of 'loss events', are met. 
The problem with this third approach, as was noted in motivating the IASB (2009) 
IEIR-based proposal (IASB 2009, paragraph BC11), is that the restrictive nature of the 
specified conditions might result in credit-premium-inclusive interest revenue being 
recognised in advance of the associated initially-expected shortfalls.  
The problem with IL methods referred to above brings us back to the information set 
that is permitted to be used as the basis for the accounting recognition of credit losses. A 
broadening of the information set within an IL framework, to include reasonable and 
supportable forecasts of future events and economic conditions and with fuller use of the pre-
existing 'incurred but not reported' concept, might have addressed both the need for new 
information on credit losses to be recognised in a more timely manner and the need for 
initially-expected losses to be recognised significantly earlier than under pre-existing 
practice. A broadening of the information set within an IL framework could reasonably be 
expected to reduce substantially the mismatch between the timing of the recognition of 
initially-expected losses and the recognition of associated credit-premium-inclusive interest 
revenue that the IASB (2009) spreading approach was aimed at addressing. Such a route 
would present accounting standard setters with a challenge in balancing the desirability of a 
broader and more forward-looking permitted information set against the desirability of 
restriction on earnings management. However, such a challenge also exists with the EL 
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methods that have been developed. Also, as illustrated in subsection 2.3.1, earnings 
management by banks is an extensively researched issue and is likely to be familiar territory 
for accounting standard setters and accountants.  
At least, such an approach would have avoided conceptually-questionable day-1-loss 
which, because the FASB and IASB could not agree on the degree of conservatism to be 
applied in recognising losses at day 1, was an important contributor to the failure of the 
FASB and the IASB to achieve convergence on accounting for credit losses.  
It is helpful to consider now what might have been the main contributory factor to the 
requirements for day-1 losses in the final FASB and IASB standards. The fact that IASB 
(2009) was issued in the immediate aftermath of the crisis and proposed an EL method 
without day-1 losses suggests that neither political and regulatory pressure for increased loss 
allowances in the immediate aftermath of the crisis nor the choice of an EL route itself was a 
main contributory factor. We believe that the main contributory factor was the choice to 
adopt the particular type of EL approach that was eventually adopted. We make the following 
distinction between EL approaches:  
1. Spreading-based approaches. Methods that aim to achieve the suitably timely 
recognition over time of initially-expected losses, for example through the IASB (2009) 
IEIR method or the FASB/IASB (2011a) TPA method, plus immediate recognition of 
changes in expectations about expected losses. 
2. Immediate-recognition-based approaches. Methods that aim to achieve the recognition 
at each reporting date of expected future losses. This category includes the FASB 
(2016) CECL method. The IASB (2014a) method also falls into this category, although 
its use of a 12-month good-book loss allowance is aimed at approximating the 
distribution of income across time that would occur under spreading-based approaches. 
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A key difference between the two categories is that the first does not give rise to day-1 losses 
but the second does. The key factor leading to day-1 losses appears to have been the choice, 
after spreading-based EL approaches had been eliminated from consideration during the 
three-bucket deliberations, to follow immediate-recognition-based EL approaches of the type 
that prudential regulators might be comfortable with. As observed above, an alternative path 
that could have been taken at this point was exploration of broader-information-set-based and 
more-responsive IL-type approaches that could have approximated the outcomes of an EL 
spreading approach without leading to day-1 losses. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In the wake of the financial and banking crisis of the late 2000s, the FASB and the IASB 
moved quickly to improve the timeliness of the accounting recognition of credit losses, 
including through an attempt to reach a converged common solution. With regard to 
accounting for credit losses, the crisis appeared to have prompted a shift in relative concern 
away from the need to constrain earnings management and towards the need to facilitate 
timeliness of loss recognition and loss-allowance adequacy. With the encouragement of the 
Financial Stability Board (2009), BCBS (2009) and the Financial Crisis Advisory Group 
(2009), the accounting standard setters followed a route based on the concept of EL, which in 
relation to credit losses had originally become prominent for the purpose of setting banks' 
capital requirements. Following the EL route, the standard setters arrived relatively 
straightforwardly at a converged broadening of the information set to be used for the purpose 
of estimating credit losses to be recognised in financial statements, such that it would include 
reasonable and supportable forecasts. We believe that this directly addresses to a significant 
degree problems with the timeliness of the accounting for credit losses that were highlighted 
in the crisis. However, the standard setters encountered significant difficulties in their 
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attempts to address the recognition of initially-expected losses, and their failure to agree on 
this issue contributed importantly to their failure to achieve convergence on accounting for 
credit losses. After the standard setters eliminated from consideration EL methods that would 
spread the recognition of initially-expected losses over time such that they were recognised 
alongside credit-premium-inclusive interest revenue without day-1 losses, they were left with 
EL methods requiring the recognition of expected losses at each reporting date including day 
1. The recognition of day-1 losses, which is easily justified for the purpose of determining 
banks' capital requirements, is not easily justified for the purpose of measuring credit-loss 
expense and loss allowances in financial statements, as exemplified by an informed 
commentator body's observation that proposals might wreak havoc with the FASB's 
conceptual framework, an alternative view from an IASB member and a dissenting opinion 
from two FASB members. Furthermore, the issue of day-1 losses acted in combination with 
differing preferences with regard to conservatism on the part of the IASB and the FASB, with 
the latter's more conservative preference for day-1 recognition of full-contractual-life 
expected losses appearing to be motivated in part by existing practice that had been subject to 
prudential-regulatory-related influence, to contribute significantly to the failure of 
FASB/IASB convergence. With the benefit of hindsight, it appears to us possible that 
positive outcomes might have been achieved in a more straightforward and converged 
manner if, after the elimination from consideration of a spreading-based EL approach, the 
standard setters had explored broader-information-set-based and more-responsive IL-type 
approaches that could have approximated the outcomes of an EL spreading approach without 
leading to day-1 losses. 
 In conversations with some observers, we reflected on whether the EL methods that 
have now been developed would have been more effective than the IL method in mitigating 
the effects of the financial and banking crisis. From these conversations, it appears to be 
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widely believed that, although a less restrictive method might have had some beneficial 
effect, it is unlikely that any ex-ante acceptable method of accounting for credit-loss 
impairment would have substantially mitigated the consequences of a shock of the magnitude 
that occurred in the crisis. This view was also reflected in some comment letters.
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 We note 
that the financial and banking crisis of the late 2000s started in the U.S., where loss 
recognition  tended to occur earlier than elsewhere, which suggests the limited impact that 




Issues relating to whether a less radical route might have been advisable are expressed 




The incurred-loss impairment models in use during the financial crisis were 
criticized for (i) not recognizing losses soon enough, (ii) not incorporating 
information forward-looking enough to encompass the lifetime of assets and 
complete economic cycles, and (iii) not providing a uniform approach to the 
impairment of similar assets.  
 
The problems of the recent financial crisis did not result from an inability to 
reserve for probable credit losses proactively enough. Rather, […] the 
fundamental failure was underwriting […].  
 
To be clear, any bank capable of apprehending the magnitude of expected 
losses for the worst-performing assets during the financial crisis simply would 
not have originated or acquired those assets. Thus, the crux of the problem 
was not an incurred- versus expected-loss approach to reserves but, rather, that 
the financial system was awash in too many assets for which no reserve 
methodology would have been adequate. For the best banks, incurred-loss 
reserving worked just fine, and for the worst banks no impairment 
methodology would have helped because the fundamental failure was one of 
underwriting, not reserving.  
 
There is a legal maxim that "hard cases make bad law." It posits that difficult 
or unusual facts provide a poor basis for a law or rule of general application 
that must cover a wider range of less extreme circumstances […].  
 
Targeted improvements to existing impairment methodology are far preferable 




It may be worthwhile to consider whether the events considered in this paper are an 
example of accounting standard setters, faced with exceptional economic events that 
prompted important questions about accounting but were not to a significant degree caused 
by accounting or preventable by accounting, taking a radical route instead of another less 
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Figure 3: Numerical illustration of the IASB (2009) integrated-effective-interest-rate approach and of day-1 
recognition of lifetimes expected losses  
 
The IASB (2009) integrated-effective-interest-rate approach 
 
A bank originates at the start of year 1 (designated here 'day 1') a portfolio of loans totalling Currency Units (CU) 
1,000.00. It is believed that the fair value of the portfolio at origination is CU 1,000.00.  
 
Panel 1 of the table below gives the contractual cash flows due from the borrowers and the cash flows (net of 
expected credit losses) that, as at day 1, the bank expects to collect. Cash flows are expected to occur at yearly 
intervals, with 'Year 1' being one year after 'Day 1', etc. The effective interest rates based on contractual and expected 
cash flows are 10% and 8%, respectively. Panel 2 of the table gives the movements on the loan account (net book 
value) as they would be if the cash flows expected as at day-1 were received and were accounted for under the 
integrated effective interest rate (IEIR) method proposed in IASB (2009). 
 
 Panel 1  Panel 2 
 Expectations as at day 1  Based on cash flows expected as at day-1, under 















Cash  Carried 
forward 
Day 1 -1,000.00  -1,000.00    1,000.00 1,000.00 
Year 1 350.00 -5.00 345.00  1,000.00 80.00 -345.00 735.00 
Year 2 325.00 -10.00 315.00  735.00 58.80 -315.00 478.80 
Year 3 300.00 -16.00 284.00  478.80 38.30 -284.00 233.10 







     
 
Day-1 recognition of lifetimes expected losses 
 
This illustration uses the numbers given in the table above. 
 
The fair value of the CU 1,000.00 of the portfolio of loans can be written as the present value of the contractual cash 







 = CU 1,000.00. 
 It can also be written as follows as the expected cash flows discounted at the IEIR based on expected cash flows 
(8%):  






 = CU 1,000.00. 
 
In illustrating the recognition of lifetime expected losses at day 1, 'loss' is estimated using discounted-cash-flow 
(DCF). In measuring impairment of financial assets, DCF is required under IASB (2014a) and is permitted, but not 
required, under FASB (2016). The net book value of the portfolio after subtracting the day-1 loss would be measured 
as follows by discounting the expected cash flows, net of expected credit losses, at the contractual EIR of 10%: 






 = CU 959.29. 
 
The day-1 loss (expense) and day-1 loss allowance (contra-asset account) to be recognised would be 1,000.00 - 
959.29 = CU 40.71. The amount of CU 959.29 could be said to reflect initially-expected credit losses twice: within 
the cash flows, which are stated net of those initially-expected losses, and within the discount rate of 10%, which 
includes a premium to compensate for those initially expected losses. If the portfolio were to be written down 
immediately (at day 1) to CU 959.29, it would be stated at below the fair value of CU 1,000.00. 
 
Note: The situation depicted here is different from one in which a loan is made on favourable terms such that the fair 
value of the expected recoverable amounts is less than the amount lent. It is uncontroversial that, in such 
circumstances, the loan should be written down to fair value at day 1. 
